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DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE 
FUTURE: A STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 
Merritt B. Fox,* Lawrence R. Glosten,** Edward F. 
Greene*** & Sue S. Guan**** 
This Article evaluates the implications of distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) for the securities markets of the future and 
their regulation.  DLT is an integral part of the larger 
revolution in computing, communication and data storage 
capacity that has transformed securities markets over the last 
few decades and promises further radical change in the years 
to come.  The potential of DLT, if it can be realized, could 
improve the functioning of our securities markets while at the 
same time sharply reducing costs.  Based on an interview 
survey of about 100 persons who play prominent roles in 
actually making these markets work or in regulating them, this 
Article reports on the most important topics and themes that 
have emerged from the wide range of interviewees’ opinions 
about the extent to which DLT will affect the future of securities 
markets and their regulation. A significant number saw the 
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potential for DLT to transform securities markets and market 
structure, from the possibility of stock trading on DLT to the 
potential impact on intermediaries, the ordinary retail 
investor, and on preventing wrongdoing in the stock market.  
However, key questions remain about implementation and the 
appetite for making DLT-based changes among both market 
participants and regulators.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Information and securities markets have always been 
tightly intertwined. Over history, progress around the 
communication and processing of information has brought 
successive transformations in how these markets operate.1 
With each of these transformations has come a new set of 
regulatory challenges and opportunities.2   
Today, there is much excitement around the latest 
manifestation of the information technology revolution: 
distributed ledger technology (DLT). DLT is an integral part 
of the larger revolution in computing, communication, and 
data storage that has totally remade securities markets in 
recent decades3 and promises further radical change in the 
 
1 See Dan Awrey & Kathryn Judge, Why Financial Regulation Keeps 
Falling Short, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2295, 2302–08 (2020) (outlining the dynamic 
nature of financial markets); see also generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
THE IMPACT OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES ON THE SECURITIES 
MARKETS (1997), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9CK7-QFQB] (discussing the effect of technological 
advances on the securities market). 
2 See supra note 1. 
3 See generally MERRITT B. FOX, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN & GABRIEL D. 
RAUTERBERG, THE NEW STOCK MARKET: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY (2019). 
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years to come.4 A distributed ledger is a data base that is 
shared across many individual computers, with each having 
an identical copy of the ledger.5 Each change in the ledger is 
verified by some kind of consensus protocol without the 
involvement of a central authority.6 The blockchain is a kind 
of digital ledger.7 For many kinds of transactions, DLT has 
the potential to eliminate the need for a trusted intermediary, 
assure compliance to agreed terms, and keep a traceable 
record.8 This potential, if it can be realized, could improve the 
functioning of our securities markets while at the same time 
sharply reducing costs. 
What are the implications of DLT for the securities 
markets of the future and their regulation? One way to try to 
address this question is to gather and assess the thoughts of 
the wide range of persons who play prominent roles in actually 
making these markets work or in regulating them. This 
Article reports on an effort to do just that and is based on an 
interview survey of about 100 such persons. Such a survey can 
be informative for a number of reasons. One, of course, is that 
people who have a direct stake in how our securities markets 
operate, and who have experience with them in a hands-on 
way every day, can provide insights and knowledge not easily 
accessible by scholars in other ways. The survey can also be 
useful to help understand the political economy of these 
markets and their regulation, and to sharpen our 
understanding of the various goals that securities regulation 
seeks to serve and the tradeoffs among them. Changes that 
 
4 See generally SECURITIES MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Merritt B. Fox et al. eds., 2018). 
5 For a discussion of the different ways DLT has been defined, see 
MICHEL RAUCHS ET AL., CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN., UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, 
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 19–
20 (2018), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2018-10-
26-conceptualising-dlt-systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S7T-DFKK]. 
6 Id. at 24. 
7 See id. at 25–27; Ryan J. Davies & Erik R. Sirri, The Economics of 
Trading Markets, in SECURITIES MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 
supra note 4, at 145, 203–04. 
8 See Davies & Sirri, supra note 7, at 203–06. 
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could be brought by DLT, like so many other changes that 
information technology has been bringing to the markets in 
recent years, would substantially disrupt how business is 
done. As in any regulated industry, that disruption would 
force regulators to adapt, prompting an inevitable 
reexamination of the goals of the regulatory system.9 If such 
a disruption occurs, it will bring to the fore underlying 
conflicts among the different types of market participants that 
have just simmered in the background when debates have 
only involved more minor changes in established ways of 
doing business. More idealistically, such a disruption could 
remake the world anew from a regulatory and business point 
of view. All of this means that an intelligent discussion of the 
implications of DLT for the securities markets requires an 
understanding not only of the technology and its possible 
securities market applications, but also of what different 
types of market participants think the goals of securities 
regulation should be and how they think those goals should be 
met. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides some 
background concerning the survey and information on how it 
was conducted. Parts III through XI summarize and assess 
the most important topics and themes that have emerged from 
the interviews. Part III discusses the overall potential of DLT 
broadly conceived. Part IV considers the possibility of stock 
trading on DLT.  Part V relates to market structure concerns. 
Part VI considers the impact of DLT on the division of activity 
between private and public markets for securities. Part VII 
considers the possible impact of DLT on the ordinary retail 
investor. Part VIII considers its potential impact on the role 
of intermediaries. Part IX considers how DLT-based changes 
might provide opportunities for both undertaking and 
preventing wrongdoing in the market, and Part X considers 
digital coins. Finally, Part XI focuses specifically on 
regulatory responses to DLT-based changes. 
 
9 See Awrey & Judge, supra note 1, at 2320–21. 
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In this review of the survey’s results, we will see that the 
interviewees expressed a wide range of opinions about the 
extent to which DLT will affect the future of securities 
markets and their regulation. A significant number saw the 
potential for DLT to transform securities markets, but key 
questions remain about implementation and the appetite for 
making DLT-based changes among both market participants 
and regulators.   
II. THE SURVEY 
The Columbia Law School/Columbia Business School 
Program in the Law and Economics of Capital Markets has 
been conducting interviews using its Stakeholder Survey 
since the summer of 2019. This is an interview-based survey 
of a wide range of stakeholders in the securities markets.  The 
interviewees include domestic and international regulators, 
relevant persons from securities-issuing corporations, 
securities-trading venues of different types, broker-dealer 
firms, institutional investors, retail investor protection 
organizations, securities law firms, blockchain entrepreneurs, 
technology and financial institutions utilizing new DLTs, and 
academics whose thinking is driving the field forward. The 
Stakeholder Survey is part of the Program’s New Special 
Study of the Securities Markets, a multi-year, comprehensive, 
from-the-ground-up examination of the securities markets 
and their regulation.10 The Survey’s purpose is to gain a 
deeper understanding of the specific legal and economic issues 
 
10 The New Special Study of the Securities Markets is patterned after 
the original Special Study completed in 1963, which had a huge influence 
over the development of the securities laws for several succeeding decades. 
See generally Report of the Special Study of the Securities Markets of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95 (1963). The goal 
of the new study is to make securities regulation reform more proactive and 
less reactive, much as the original study did. See The New Special Study of 
the Securities Markets, COLUM. L. SCH.: THE PROGRAM IN THE L. & ECON. OF 
CAP. MKTS., https://capital-markets.law.columbia.edu/content/new-special-
study-securities-markets [https://perma.cc/3WMB-RLVD] (last visited Feb. 
24, 2021). 
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that these stakeholders consider to be most critical to the 
market’s regulation. In particular, the Survey explores what 
regulatory changes each respondent regards as most needed 
and why. Understanding the impact of DLT on the securities 
markets and their regulation will inevitably be a critical part 
of the mission of the larger New Special Study Project, so this 
has been a special focus of the Stakeholder Survey. This 
Article reports on what this focus has uncovered.11 
As a starting point, the Program organized a Roundtable 
in June 2019 to test and discuss a set of draft questions to be 
included in the Survey. With backgrounds in law, finance, and 
computer science,12 the participants focused on how data, 
blockchain, and smart contract technologies are affecting 
economics, law, and policy in the securities markets. The 
Roundtable was critical in shaping the Survey, helping to 
determine who would be interviewed and the questions they 
would be asked.   
Following the Roundtable, interviews began late in the 
summer of 2019 and have been conducted with about 100 
persons. On the regulatory side, these have included nine 
current or former SEC Commissioners, including three former 
Chairs or Acting Chairs of the Commission, the head of the 
Brazilian Commissão de Valores Mobiliários (“CVM”—the 
Brazilian equivalent to the SEC), the former Chair of the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators, and the CEO 
of FINRA. On the private side, the interviewees included the 
heads of some the largest trading venues as well as the former 
CEO of the management company of one of the world’s largest 
mutual fund families. We also interviewed many persons with 
key operating responsibilities on the regulatory and private 
 
11 The Stakeholder Survey and its particular focus on DLT has been 
assisted by a generous grant from the Columbia-IBM Center for Blockchain 
and Data Transparency. See Understanding Blockchain Technology’s 
Impact on the Securities Markets, COLUMBIA-IBM CTR. FOR BLOCKCHAIN AND 
DATA TRANSPARENCY (June 12, 2019), https://cu-ibm-blockchain-
data.columbia.edu/news/blockchain-technology-securities-markets 
[https://perma.cc/F5C4-GRVL]. 
12 The attendees at the Roundtable are listed in Part XIII app. A. 
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side, among them a number of lawyers and economists with 
firsthand knowledge of the securities markets. The full list 
and their positions at the time of the interview are listed in 
Appendix B. 
Each interview lasted approximately an hour. Each 
interviewee was sent a list with a wide range of potential 
questions, attached as Appendix C, but the interview itself 
was conducted in an open-ended, discursive fashion in order 
to take full advantage of each interviewee’s specific expertise 
and to solicit the particular insights they had to offer. The 
interviews were recorded for our own purposes, but the 
interviewees were told these recordings would not be made 
public and that they would not be quoted by name or in some 
other easily identifiable way. When interviews began in the 
summer of 2019, the U.S. economy was experiencing robust 
growth,13 and our interviews reflected thoughts about the 
world as it existed then. The world has, of course, changed 
drastically since, including the sharp Spring 2020 decline in 
equity prices and subsequent recovery,14 the severe Spring 
2020 difficulties in the short-term corporate credit market,15 
the continued economic downturn with its severe damage to 
certain sectors of the economy,16 and the remarkable COVID-
 
13 See Sarah Chaney, Strength in U.S. Consumer Spending Drives 
Economy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2019, 1:41 PM) (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-consumer-
spending-rose-sharply-in-july-11567168319. 
14 See Akane Otani, Covid-19 Fueled Stock Market Selloff Last Year. 
Here Are Some Lessons Learned., WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2021, 5:30 AM) (on 
file with the Columbia Business Law Review), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-crashed-the-stock-market-a-year-
ago-here-are-some-lessons-learned-11615113001. 
15 See Matt Wirz, Short-Term Bond Market Roiled by Panic Selling, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2020, 10:43 AM) (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-term-bond-market-roiled-
by-panic-selling-11584542633. 
16 See Gwynn Guilford, U.S. Unemployment Claims Reach New Covid-
19 Pandemic Low, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2021, 11:56 AM) (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weekly-
jobless-claims-coronavirus-05-06-2021-11620247798 (noting that 
employment numbers, though improved, remained low even in May 2021). 
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19-imposed switch to remote work for most people involved in 
the securities markets.17 
III. THE OVERALL POTENTIAL OF DLT 
Multiple interviewees said using DLT in the securities 
markets might have significant benefits. These could include 
lower clearing and settlement costs, an indelible and unified 
record of transactions that would make it far easier for 
enforcement officials to survey and trace transactions in order 
to detect and prove violations, enhanced data privacy and 
monitoring capabilities, and, as discussed below, even a 
platform for trading at least some, and perhaps all, stocks.18 
Broadly speaking, as one member of the broker-dealer 
community put it, anything that reduces the costs and 
enhances the operational effectiveness of the securities 
markets’ payments system is inherently valuable. Another 
member of the regulatory community said blockchain might 
generally be used to make recordkeeping more efficient and 
for avoiding the expense of a trusted intermediary where one 
would otherwise be necessary.   
Yet, just as frequently, interviewees expressed substantial 
concerns about whether the markets and regulators were 
ready for DLT. As one member of the regulatory community 
stated, fully functioning DLT-based markets would require 
near-universal adoption of DLT, which seems very unlikely 
unless regulators come up with a long-term plan for creating 
incentives to adopt it and guidance on implementing it. 
Misgivings about whether implementation would in fact, 
on balance, be positive also emerged as a theme in many of 
the interviews. As one interviewee pointed out, even if right 
now DLT could facilitate audit trails and recordkeeping, an 
entity would still be needed to bring buyers and sellers 
 
17 See Kate Kelly, Dust Off Desks and Boot Up Terminals: Wall St. 
Returns, Fitfully, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020) (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/business/wall-
street-return-to-office.html. 
18 See infra Part IV. 
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together, and using DLT to create a trading platform that 
would substitute for a stock exchange is a much more 
ambitious task. Interviewees also commonly noted the 
obstacles of scaling up the functionality of DLT for widespread 
use as a trading and clearance and settlement platform in the 
equities markets, where a huge volume of transactions occurs 
every minute.19   
IV. PUBLIC TRADING AND OFFERING OF STOCKS 
ON DLT? 
Publicly trading and offering stocks on DLT would have a 
number of advantages.  But how practical would it be?  Much 
depends on the scalability of DLT and the market’s and 
regulators’ appetite for a more disintermediated system. Nor 
is it obvious that there is any way for DLT to perform the 
function currently performed by exchanges and other trading 
venues in bringing together prospective buying and selling 
interests so that they can find each other. 
A. Potential Advantages 
In the current system of trading stocks publicly on an 
exchange or through another venue, a buyer and a seller 
anonymously agree to transact a given number of shares for a 
given price.20  Then, two days later, the promised money is 
exchanged for the promised stock in what is known as clearing 
and settlement.21 It is critical for the functioning of this 
anonymous market that buyers and sellers feel confident that 
 
19 For example, over a ten-day period in early May 2021, the New York 
Stock Exchange alone processed an average of 4,918,695 trades per day, or 
over 3,400 per minute. See U.S. Equities Market Volume Summary, NASDAQ 
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), 
https://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader.aspx?id=FullVolumeSummary (last 
updated May 14, 2021) (click “Trades”). 
20 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 20. 
21 On this process, see Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 15,564, 15,564–69 (Mar. 29, 2017) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 
(2020)). 
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their deals will be honored.  Currently, this confidence is 
established by a complex system that requires every buyer or 
seller to place its order through a broker who then acts as a 
backup should its customer fail to perform.22 The system in 
turn includes a clearing and settlement system whereby other 
brokers, in essence, back up the customer’s particular broker 
in case the broker itself fails.23 It is in clearing and settlement 
that the actual exchange of stock for money occurs.24 
The most optimistic interviewees believe that a DLT-based 
system could both perform the function of the trading venue—
matching potential buyers and sellers who could directly 
submit their orders to it—and then instantaneously provide 
for the exchange of stock for money. This could generate 
substantial cost savings. Brokers, the exchanges, and the 
clearing and settlement entity would no longer be necessary 
and making the exchange of stock and money instantaneous 
would free up the capital currently required to back a two-day 
lag.25   
The DLT system could also manage each corporation’s 
stock ledger more efficiently. Unlike today’s system, which 
promotes easy trading by making broker-provided nominees 
the record holders of most stock,26 DLT would identify the 
actual beneficial shareholders at any given moment.27 This 
would simplify distribution of dividends and required 
shareholder notifications and bring order to the currently 
chaotic system of shareholder voting.28 Many of these 
 
22 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 20. 
23 See Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 82 Fed. Reg. at 15,567. 
24 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 264. 
25 On this use of capital, see Securities Transaction Settlement Cycle, 
82 Fed. Reg. at 15,569–71. 
26 For a recent summary of this system, see Brandon Ferrick, Note, 
Modernizing the Stockholder Shield: How Blockchains and Distributed 
Ledgers Could Rescue the Appraisal Remedy, 60 B.C. L. REV. 621, 626–31 
(2019). 
27 See Davies & Sirri, supra note 7, at 203–06. 
28 See, e.g., generally George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate 
Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (2018) (discussing DLT and shareholder 
voting). 
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advantages, on a one-time basis, would also accompany public 
offerings of stocks utilizing DLT. And doing an offering in this 
fashion would lay the groundwork for the secondary trading 
of the stock to be DLT-based, as well. 29 
 
29 Recent pilot projects involving the primary offering or secondary 
trading of very specific securities suggest that the hopes of those imagining 
wide-spread DLT-based offerings and trading are not entirely fanciful. See, 
e.g., Press Release, Vanguard, Vanguard Advances Blockchain Technology 
Pilot To Streamline Asset-Backed Securities Markets (June 11, 2020), 
https://pressroom.vanguard.com/news/Press-Release-Vanguard-Advances-
Blockchain-Technology-Pilot-061120.html [https://perma.cc/JFH3-P464] 
(“Vanguard, in partnership with technology provider Symbiont, announced 
today the completion of the first phase of a blockchain pilot designed to 
digitize the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS). In close collaboration 
with a large US ABS issuer, as well as BNY Mellon, Citi, and State Street, 
Vanguard successfully modeled the full lifecycle of an ABS settlement on [a] 
distributed ledger technology (DLT) network by replicating end-to-end 
transaction flows.”); SIX Digital Exchange Launches DLT-Based Trading 
and Settlement Prototype, FINEXTRA (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/34460/six-digital-exchange-launches-
dlt-based-trading-and-settlement-prototype [https://perma.cc/86S2-XYHG] 
(“Swiss stock exchange SIX has launched a prototype of its distributed 
ledger technology-based digital exchange and central securities depository. 
Meanwhile, trading has started on Boerse Stuttgart Digital Exchange.”); 
Press Release, Societe Generale, Societe Generale Issued the First Covered 
Bond as a Security Token on a Public Blockchain (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.societegenerale.com/en/newsroom/first-covered-bond-as-a-
security-token-on-a-public-blockchain [https://perma.cc/ZSA4-ZTVG] (“On 
18 April 2019 Societe Generale SFH, a subsidiary of Societe Generale 
Group, issued EUR 100m of covered bonds . . . as a security token, directly 
registered on the Ethereum blockchain.”); Joseph Lubin et al., The Role of 
CSDs and Ethereum in Decentralized Finance, CONSENSYS (Apr. 2019), 
https://pages.consensys.net/advancing-capital-markets-with-blockchain-
technology [https://perma.cc/ZF2Q-VEXS] (“In April of this year, CapBridge 
announced 1exchange (1X), a private securities exchange built on the public 
Ethereum blockchain in collaboration with ConsenSys and regulated by the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore. 1X will tokenize securities, creating an 
immutable digital representation of investments on the blockchain that are 
easier, cheaper, and more secure to manage. Moreover, the standardization 
and universality of public Ethereum mainnet ensures 1X is aligning itself 
to a growing, global, borderless liquidity pool—positioning itself to connect 
with other blockchain-based exchanges in the future. 1X will provide 
optimized tracking ability of securities traded on its platform by investors. 
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B. Views of Interviewees as to the Potential for 
Trading and Offering Stock Using DLT 
A number of interviewees raised the possibility of trading 
stock on blockchain technology.  For example, one member of 
the regulatory community believes that the ability to use 
blockchain for detailed audits without intermediaries could 
persuade markets to trade stock on blockchain technology. 
Several legal practitioners suggested that DLT can enable the 
tracing of changes in share ownership after a direct listing 
transaction or a secondary offering. This would solve the 
problem of attaching section 11 liability, with its power to 
deter registration statement misstatements, to any purchases 
of an issuer’s shares after it has engaged in a direct listing or 
to any share offered in a seasoned offering that has been 
traded in the secondary market by the time the misstatement 
has been discovered.30 
Even if moving all publicly traded stocks to an exclusive 
DLT platform proves impractical in the near future, one 
member of the regulatory community raised a narrower 
 
Additionally, investors will have real-time and ongoing visibility into their 
investments without having to mediate with an exchange or third party.”). 
30 The courts have interpreted section 11 damages liability for material 
misstatements in a registration statement as applying only to the securities 
that the statement actually registers. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 
272 (2d Cir. 1967). This poses a problem for registration statements filed in 
connection with a seasoned offering or direct listing. When such a 
registration statement contains a material misstatement, it is currently 
technologically impossible for potential plaintiff who acquired a share in the 
secondary market after the registration statement’s effective date to trace 
whether the share she acquired was one that was registered by that 
registration statement since shares that have and that have not been 
registered by this registration statement are both trading interchangeably 
in the market.  Section 11 liability thus is a key concern with direct listings, 
which has become a new way to go public following the examples of unicorns 
Spotify and Slack. See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Couns., Council 
of Inst. Invs., to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
9–11 (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy 
/correspondence/2020/20200908%20Letter%20to%20SEC%20w%20attach
ments.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG73-G6WE]. 
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possibility: some tier of equities (smaller companies’ stocks, 
for example, which have a lower volume of trading)31 could 
trade solely on their own single, DLT-based market, thereby 
eliminating the need for central clearing of these stocks. A 
member of the nonprofit community pointed out that the SEC 
is already experimenting with placing stock on a blockchain 
(though he noted that this would be illegal under current 
regulation). The Boston Security Token Exchange has sought 
to become a listing exchange for equities as tokenized 
securities, relying on the Ethereum public blockchain for 
certain recordkeeping.32 
Various interviewees saw benefits to particular features of 
a DLT-based trading system.  One member of the financial 
services industry thought DLT could transform clearing and 
settlement if deployed in a “widgetized,” confidential matter 
(analogizing this to the move toward a cashless society). 
Recordkeeping is another important potential application of 
DLT. A member of the financial services industry pointed out 
the importance of tracking information, noting that a factor 
contributing to the 2008 financial crisis was flawed 
recordkeeping in the derivatives market, which caused 
problems when credit issues arose and participants could not 
determine their actual positions.33 Also, the increased clarity 
of DLT was commented upon as useful for tracking the 
 
31 See, e.g., Gilles Zumbach, How Trading Activity Scales with 
Company Size in the FTSE 100, 4 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 441, 442 (2004). 
32 For more information, see Order Disapproving Proposed Rule 
Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, To Adopt Rules Governing the 
Trading of Equity Securities on the Exchange Through a Facility of the 
Exchange Known as the Boston Security Token Exchange LLC, 85 Fed. Reg. 
84,403, 84,404 (Dec. 28, 2020); About BTSX, BOS SEC.TOKEN EXCH., 
https://bstx.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/JRL4-MXCJ] (last visited May 16, 
2021); Letter from Benjamin Connault, Economist, Invs. Exch., to Vanessa 
Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-box-2019-19/srbox201919-7004560-
214855.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQT5-R9KQ]. 
33 See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT 228, 298–301 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-
FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH8P-6Y9P]. 
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current ownership of shares in real time, alleviating concerns 
about the tally of proxy votes actually corresponding to the 
choices of a firm’s beneficial shareholders.34 
C. Problems Implementing DLT-Based Systems for 
Securities 
The discussion above highlights a theme: we have heard 
regulators, industry participants, and academics praise the 
potential of DLT to facilitate transparency and recordkeeping 
and reduce the need for trusted intermediaries. Yet those 
same interviewees expressed major concerns about the 
technological and economic challenges to implementation, as 
well as the hurdles to changing existing regulation and the 
resistance of parties vested in current practices. 
Scalability is a significant obstacle to widespread use of a 
DLT-based trading system, particularly for the stocks of the 
largest 500 or 1000 public companies. Multiple interviewees 
stressed that such equities markets see a huge volume of 
transactions, which occur in microseconds. Currently Bitcoin 
can handle four transactions per second,35 while over one 
 
34 See Proxy Voting by Blockchain, MKTS. MEDIA (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.marketsmedia.com/proxy-voting-blockchain/ 
[https://perma.cc/A7WE-MX86] (“Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. 
(NYSE:BR), J.P. Morgan, Northern Trust and Banco Santander today 
announced the successful completion of a pilot which employs a blockchain 
technology to enhance global proxy vote transparency and analytics.”); 
Lubin et al., supra note 29 (“We can also initiate template-driven smart 
contract generation of new assets with the listing requirements based on 
previously captured issuer data, like a smart prospectus. This has the 
potential to reduce fees as well as mechanical reliance on third parties. This 
can also enhance shareholder voting and governance in general, as 
automation of registry data improves certainty of beneficial ownership and 
to whom an entitlement or right is due without extensive research or 
reconciliation. A common registry of ownership associated with an ID means 
the issuer or issuer’s agent will know exactly who has which rights.”); 
Spencer J. Nord, Blockchain Plumbing: A Potential Solution for 
Shareholder Voting?, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 706, 708–09 (2019). 
35 See Press Release, Bitcoin SV, 9,000 Transactions Per Second: 
Bitcoin SV Hits New Record (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.prnewswire 
.com/news-releases/9-000-transactions-per-second-bitcoin-sv-hits-new-
FOX ET AL. 8/22/2021  9:05 PM 
666 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
 
thousand transactions occur per second on the U.S. stock 
exchanges.36 Even if this problem were fixed, the system 
would undoubtedly require significant levels of financing. 
Moreover, there is the question of how the payments system 
would be set up. As one member of the financial services 
industry explained, the system’s basic reliance on financing 
means that if the benefit of DLT is that it allows transactions 
to occur instantly, enormous amounts of money would also 
need to be moved instantly. Using digital coins rather than 
dollars as payment might appear to solve this problem, but 
the value of currently available coins is highly volatile, and 
they have a history of being stolen from digital wallets.37 
There are also problems with how such a system would deal 
with error trades, though one interviewee did note that 
perhaps this problem would be minimal in an auction setting 
and hence DLT might be more easily applied there. 
Beyond these questions of technological and economic 
feasibility, there is, as noted by multiple interviewees from the 
regulatory and broker-dealer communities, the matter of 
legacy firms having a technological “debt.” In other words, 
even if the benefits to society of switching now (assuming 
everyone did it at once) might outweigh the costs, the private 
benefits to firms would not. Switching would require them to 
abandon investments in existing ways of doing things that are 
continuing to earn substantial returns. Moreover, the 
 
record-301217145.html [https://perma.cc/YQ4L-RZWH] (comparing 
Bitcoin’s capacity to the press release preparer’s). 
36 Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in 
Financial Markets 1 n.3 (Jan. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (citing 
UTP PLAN, U.S. CONSOLIDATED TAPE DATA, https://www.utpplan.com/), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/dera-wp-hft-synchronizes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E3GZ-A3W3]; see also supra note 19 (giving data 
suggesting that well over 500 transactions occur each second on the New 
York Stock Exchange alone). 
37 See Steven Russolillo, Hackers Swipe More Than $40 Million of 
Bitcoin from Cryptocurrency Exchange, WALL ST. J. (MAY 8, 2019, 2:27 AM) 
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hackers-swipe-more-than-40-million-of-
bitcoin-from-cryptocurrency-exchange-11557296830. 
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incumbents are unlikely to be forced to adopt a superior 
technology due to the fear of potential competition:  because 
of the incumbents’ first mover advantages, new competing 
entrants using DLT-based technology are unlikely to erode 
substantially, at least in the short run, the market share of 
the incumbents. These interviewees contrast this situation 
with AI and machine learning, which can be scaled up much 
more easily—AI and machine learning is increasingly used 
successfully in the robo-advising context, for instance.38 
Moreover, the current system of stock trading is generally 
perceived as functioning well and at a lower cost per trade 
than ever before.39 In sum, these interviewees feel that the 
various incumbent entities that operate the current system of 
trading and clearing and settlement are unlikely to experience 
either strong market incentives or significant regulatory 
pressures to transition soon to a DLT-based system. 
 
38 See, e.g., AI To Enhance Investment Decision-Making, FIDELITY (on 
file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://institutional. 
fidelity.com/app/item/RD_9889536/ai-to-enhance-investment-decision-
making.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2020) (“When surveying 900 institutions 
across 25 countries for the Global Institutional Investor Survey, Fidelity 
found three-quarters of respondents think it’s unlikely the industry will be 
the same in seven years. Many cited potential disruption by artificial 
intelligence (AI), but optimism is generally high around the world about its 
potential incorporation into many high-value investing functions such as 
evaluating portfolio performance and risk and determining optimal asset 
allocation strategy. When it comes to this application, evidence from our 
survey responses suggests that many of these services are expected to be 
utilized as a tool to augment work, not fully supplant the roles of analysts 
or institutions’ investment partners.”). 
39 On cost per trade, see Brian F. Mannix, Finding—and Fixing—
Flaws in Financial Market Microstructure, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 315, 315 
(2016) (criticizing high frequency trading but acknowledging that “[i]n the 
21st century, automated algorithmic trading by computers has become the 
dominant method of exchanging securities, commodities, derivatives, and 
currencies in major markets around the world. Many more trades take 
place, at dramatically lower costs per trade, than in the days when human 
traders stood on a trading floor . . . . There is little doubt that automated 
trading has brought some substantial improvements to the efficiency of 
financial markets”). 
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Multiple interviewees also raised privacy concerns. For 
example, as one member of the legal community suggested, 
there may be a tradeoff between privacy and the transparency 
and accuracy of an immutable, decentralized record of 
transactions that DLT may offer. Investors–especially 
fundamental value traders—usually prefer to hide their 
trades for strategic reasons, a view echoed by a member of the 
broker-dealer committee. The current system preserves 
privacy quite reliably: a customer gives its order to a broker, 
which has legal duties to keep the order confidential and to 
refrain from trading for itself or other customers based on its 
knowledge of the order, and the broker in turn submits the 
order to an impersonal exchange.40 Another member of the 
broker-dealer community also said that, in a truly DLT-based 
system, the full transparency of all transactions may not be a 
good thing. While any such system could provide records of 
transactions in anonymous form, anyone might be able to 
observe a sequence of transactions by a single entity, thereby 
raising this entity’s cost of trading and eroding the trading 
profits that it can extract based on its research. Hacking and 
cybersecurity also present significant concerns,41 so that 
ensuring a secure blockchain could prove costly and difficult.   
Some interviewees, including one from the regulatory 
community, said brokers would, at least in the short term, 
probably continue to handle investor orders and trading 
would continue to occur on exchanges and today’s other 
trading venues, but that clearing and settlement could 
happen on a DLT-based system.42  Using DLT for clearing and 
 
40 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 97. 
41 See Russolillo, supra note 37. 
42 On some potential DLT platforms, see micobo GmbH, Technical 
Difference Between Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric and R3 Corda, MEDIUM 





ava%20Virtual%20Machine [https://perma.cc/GU8H-NG6P] (analyzing the 
differences among Ethereum, Hyperledger, and Corda). 
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settlement seems technologically feasible. As one member of 
the financial services community put it succinctly:  If Walmart 
can put its supply chain on blockchain, JP Morgan can settle 
trades on blockchain. The problem, the interviewee asserted, 
lies in the existence (or absence) of an insurgent (challenger) 
bank with a vested interest in unseating highly-entrenched 
current systems. 
Also, as one member of the regulatory community 
cautioned, even this modest reform would probably not 
eliminate completely the trusted intermediary involved—
currently The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC).43  Getting rid of DTCC or its equivalent would also 
eliminate the oversight that such an entity offers, and so the 
SEC would likely insist that the new platform include a 
trusted person. Then, by declaring that trusted person to be a 
broker-dealer, the SEC could continue to exercise oversight.44 
This interviewee also said he believed that brokers would 
have little incentive to participate in any such platform 
because the SEC has cast doubt on brokers’ ability to maintain 
adequate custody and control of assets on a distributed 
ledger.45 This interviewee also believed that the SEC’s desire 
to have a trusted person in charge was wise—even though it 
would mean continuing the resource costs and rents 
associated with a trusted party that a trustless DLT system 
would eliminate. His broader point was that using DLT for 
clearing and settlement would not make an entity such as the 
DTCC obsolete anytime soon, a view shared by other 
interviewees. And, even if DLT could create real efficiencies, 
the current incumbent may not have much incentive to make 
the change to DLT or feel much pressure to do so from 
regulators. 
 
43 For an overview of DTCC’s role, see Ferrick, supra note 26, at 626–
31. 
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2019). 
45 The SEC recently requested comment on the custody issue. See 
generally Custody of Digital Asset Securities by Special Purpose Broker-
Dealers, 86 Fed. Reg. 11,627 (Feb. 26, 2021). 
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D. Summation and Questions Going Forward 
In sum, interviewees thus far expressed some appetite for 
using DLT for stock trading; however, significant concerns 
over scalability and oversight remain. As one regulator put it, 
even if DLT helps with audit trails and recordkeeping, a 
market still needs some mechanism for bringing parties 
together. Any real change would require everyone to use 
blockchain, which will not happen unless regulators come up 
with a some-years-long plan for implementing it. As noted, 
perhaps a middle ground would still involve brokers placing 
orders on exchanges, with clearing and settlement occurring 
exclusively on a blockchain.  But again, the brokers and 
exchanges would all need to be in the blockchain environment 
for this to truly work. 
The foregoing discussion suggests a few questions going 
forward. What is being done to think through the implications 
of a truly trustless system? Even as technology is developed to 
facilitate a DLT-based trading world, what additionally will 
need to occur in order to increase market and regulatory 
appetite for that world? What incentives would lead firms to 
adopt technology, such as DLT, which is extremely costly and 
difficult to implement on a large scale? 
V. MARKET STRUCTURE 
How well are today’s markets operating? Can DLT improve 
or address concerns about market structure? One broad theme 
emerged from our interviews: There is wide disagreement 
about which interests our markets should promote and which 
interests current market structures in fact serve. It is thus 
important to understand these different points of view in 
order to see what a DLT-based system might offer and how it 
should be designed. Understanding these issues, even ones 
that do not appear to touch directly upon DLT and its 
application to securities markets, also helps us understand 
what economic and political obstacles may impede adoption of 
a DLT-based system. This is true even if, from society’s point 
of view, the benefits would appear to exceed the costs. 
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Some interviewees, spanning the regulatory and 
investment communities, felt that the markets were overall 
operating well and fairly. Different interviewees stressed 
different positives.  One member of the regulatory community 
believes they are working relatively well at least with respect 
to price discovery. Another said insiders do not have an 
advantage over ordinary investors, and buy and hold investors 
have never been better off given low trading costs and 
instantaneous executions.46 Other interviewees, however, 
expressed concerns about current market structure— and 
especially the prices that exchanges charge for proprietary 
data, the fee and rebate policies of the stock exchanges in their 
dealings with brokers,47 and the paradox of trading venues 
being both too fragmented and insufficiently competitive. 
A. Fees for Proprietary Data 
Data concerning best available quotes and transactions 
occurring on each exchange are available to market 
participants in a consolidated, SEC-mandated feed referred to 
as the SIP.48  There is a slight delay, however, between when 
a transaction or a change in a quote occurs and, after 
processing, its appearance on the SIP.49 Each exchange 
charges a fee for access to this data at the same moment it is 
sent to the SIP.50 The data obtained this way is referred to as 
proprietary data.51 The customers are liquidity-supplying 
market makers and other high speed traders as well as 
sophisticated brokers.52 They are all able to put this access to 
 
46 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
47 See generally Memorandum from Div. of Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, to Mkt. Structure Advisory Comm., U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-maker-
taker-fees-on-equities-exchanges.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QY8-VMW7].   
48 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 28, 126. 
49 See id. at 126. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3,594, 
3,606–07 (Jan. 21, 2010). 
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use in ways that permit them to act more quickly than they 
could if they relied on the SIP—sometimes to the 
disadvantage of others in the market.53   
A market maker provides liquidity by submitting to 
exchanges quotes in the form of limit orders.54 A limit order, 
until cancelled, commits the submitter to buy or sell a given 
quantity of shares at a stated price (the buy price being the 
“bid,” and the sell price being the “offer” or “ask”). For the 
market maker, being able to act more quickly also means 
being able to cancel old quotes and submit new ones faster in 
response to new transactions or changes in quotes of others. 
This allows the market maker to better protect itself from 
costly adverse selection, i.e., selling to someone with 
information that the stock is worth more than the market 
maker’s offer, or buying from someone with information that 
it is worth less than the market maker’s bid. With competition 
among market makers, this reduction in a cost of doing 
business presumably lowers the effective “price” (half the 
spread between bid and ask) that market makers “charge” for 
their liquidity-supplying services. But, despite this drop in 
price, many informed traders are worse off as a result of the 
market makers’ access to proprietary data. This is because the 
traders find the market makers’ quotes moving against them 
more quickly when they begin trading on a piece of private 
information that suggests that a security is mispriced.55   
High speed traders can also use proprietary data to engage 
in profitable arbitrage that takes advantage of persons who do 
not change their quotes as quickly in response to new orders 
 
53 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 126–27. 
54 For a brief introduction to these concepts, see id. at 20–23. 
55 Cf. Market Data Infrastructure, 86 Fed. Reg. 18,596, 18,599 & n.26, 
18,560 & n.28 (Apr. 9, 2021) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) 
(noting the disadvantages experienced by traders with slower or less 
comprehensive access to market data). 
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or quotes of others.56 Brokers can use the information to trade 
for their clients with less impact on price.   
The SIP does not contain information about quotes that are 
inferior to the best quotes on each market, referred to as 
“depth of book” information.57 This information may contain 
hints about what the persons who posted the quotes might 
know. And it is valuable to brokers because often the best 
quote is only for the purchase or sale of a small number of 
shares, and so filling a larger order quickly will require 
transacting against these inferior quotes as well.58 Access to 
this depth of book data is also sold by exchanges and is also 
referred to as proprietary data.59 
A number of interviewees felt that prices for proprietary 
data were too high. One member of the investment industry, 
who otherwise lauded the markets’ functioning, felt that 
prices at current levels created persistent inefficiencies. 
Although proprietary data at current prices appears very 
profitable for the exchanges, their practices vary, and not all 
members of the exchange community defend the current 
arrangements. One member of the broker-dealer community 
stated that the cost of proprietary data was like a tax on 
investors. As another member of the exchange community 
pointed out, relying solely on the SIP for market data is 
insufficient for brokers to meet their obligation to execute 
their customers’ orders on the best terms practicable (referred 
to as the broker’s “best execution” duty),60 which essentially 
forces brokers to pay the very high price for data that most 
exchanges charge.61 And at least one member of the exchange 
 
56 See, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, Wholesaling Best Execution: How 
Entangled Are Off-Exchange Market Makers, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 149, 189 
(2016). 
57 FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 28. 
58 For an illustration of this, see id. at 27–28. 
59 Id. at 126. 
60 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 265–67 (discussing the best execution 
duty). 
61 For similar views, see Market Data Infrastructure, 86 Fed. Reg. at 
18,560 n.28. 
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community explicitly expressed a desire for additional 
regulation around market data pricing—as they and others 
worried that exchanges had more incentive to serve the 
interests of high frequency traders (HFTs) and brokers than 
the interests of longer-term investors—and for better 
enforcement of existing regulations.   
B. Rebates and User Fees 
Most exchanges pay a broker a rebate per share for every 
standing limit order sent by the broker that is executed 
against (thus rewarding the person making liquidity) and 
charge a somewhat larger fee per share for every marketable 
order that executes against a standing limit order (thus 
charging the person who takes liquidity).62 This is the “maker-
taker” fee system.63 A few exchanges do the opposite, 
operating “taker-maker” fee systems.64 And one exchange 
charges the same smaller fee to both the liquidity maker and 
taker.65 Importantly, in all these arrangements the rebates go 
to, and the fees are charged to, the broker submitting the 
order, not the customer for whom the order is being 
submitted.66 
The maker-taker and taker-maker systems raised 
concerns among some interviewees about brokers’ conflicts of 
interest: the broker, rather than seeking best execution of the 
transaction that its customer wishes to undertake, might send 
its orders to an exchange with, say, the largest rebates or 
lowest fees. As one interviewee noted, it is very difficult to see 
which brokers are receiving rebates for which trades and thus 
to monitor brokers to see if the rebates and fees are inducing 
them to violate their duties of best execution. Some 
 
62 FOX ET AL., supra note 3, 281–82. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 282. 
65 See Investors Exchange Fee Schedule, INVS. EXCH. (Apr. 1, 2021), 
https://iextrading.com/trading/fees/ [https://perma.cc/47ZA-33DZ] 
(advertising this system for at least some trades). 
66 See, e.g., id. 
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interviewees worried that such violations are occurring. As 
one member of the broker-dealer community told us, brokers 
would continue to trade on exchanges that offered them 
rebates, regardless of client execution, and those exchanges 
would continue to offer rebates in order to attract business, 
creating a conflict of interest. While acknowledging the 
difficulty of quantifying differences in execution quality, this 
interviewee suggested that a system for more efficiently 
aligning incentives would require everyone that places an 
order that executes, whether they are the party making the 
liquidity or the one taking it, to pay a set per-share fee for 
using the exchange based on some kind of cost-plus formula. 
Concern over conflicts of interest in part prompted interest 
from at least a few interviewees in MEMX, a new exchange 
that the SEC approved in May 202067 and that is being backed 
by institutional investors.68 MEMX, according to is 
proponents, is designed to cost less and be more transparent 
than existing exchanges.69   
C. Order Protection Rule 
Under the SEC’s NMS Rule 611 (known as the order 
protection rule), in most circumstances, a marketable buy or 
sell order sent to an exchange whose best quote for the stock 
is inferior to the best quote on some other exchange must be 
sent on to that other exchange.70 When the rule was 
introduced, it was justified as both assuring retail investors 
that they would get best execution and helping the 
competitive position of new entrant exchanges, which, 
because they were initially small, might not have their quotes 
 
67 MEMX LLC, 85 Fed. Reg. 27,451, 27,451 (U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
May 8, 2020). 
68 See Philip Stafford, BlackRock Throws Support Behind US Exchange 
Start-up MEMX, FIN. TIMES (May 12, 2020) (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review), https://www.ft.com/content/6aad5b60-5378-476f-
9636-4d06017fff9e. 
69 See MEMX Home Page, MEMBERS EXCH., https://memx.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/68AV-Y7BU] (last visited Apr. 4, 2021). 
70 17 CFR § 242.611(a) (2020). 
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executed against—even when those quotes were the best—
and hence not attract many quotes in the first place.71 
Multiple institutional investor interviewees criticized the 
rule, however, for complicating the filling of larger orders. One 
such interviewee, who did not like the order protection rule 
because it created risks when sourcing liquidity, suggested 
that applying the rule differently to institutional and retail 
order flows could help. This interviewee’s enthusiasm for the 
institutional-investor-backed MEMX exchange in part 
reflected the role that this exchange could play in such an 
approach.   
D. Fragmentation 
As recently as the early 1990s, trading the stock of any 
significant, publicly traded company “was still largely 
confined to a single venue, either NASDAQ or the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE).”72 Today, any given stock is 
potentially traded on each of almost seventy-five competing 
venues: more than a dozen exchanges and almost fifty dark 
pools.73 This transformation is a product of both the huge 
“increases in the speed of communication and calculation that 
have arisen from the information technology revolution” and 
deliberate choices in the way stock trading is regulated.74 
Going back as far as the 1970s, Congress and the SEC 
anticipated that developing technology could, on the one hand, 
achieve the advantages of competition——lower prices, better 
customer service, and more innovation—and, on the other 
hand, because markets would be better connected, decrease 
the risk that a buyer and seller, each willing to transact for a 
 
71 See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,501 (June 29, 2005) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (giving best execution 
and competition justifications). 
72 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis added). 
73 Id. (citing LAURA TUTTLE, ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS: 
DESCRIPTION OF ATS TRADING IN NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM STOCKS 5–6 
(2013), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/whitepapers/alternative-
trading-systems-10-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/88GD-GW4U]). 
74 Id. at 14. 
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given price, would not find each other because they were 
searching for a counterparty in different venues.75 
A number of interviewees felt that the proliferation of 
trading venues has gotten out of hand, i.e., that there is too 
much “fragmentation.” One member of the broker-dealer 
community, for example, suggested that today’s level of 
fragmentation did not create more competition but just spread 
participants across more venues. In his view, this benefited 
market makers, proprietary traders, and exchanges, at the 
expense of longer-term investors. Fragmentation may help 
make the United States a cheap place to operate for the small 
trader, he suggested, but it raises costs for brokers and for 
institutional clients trying to move large amounts of stock. 
Notwithstanding this claim, one interviewee from the market 
maker community was also unhappy with the current level of 
fragmentation and stated that having more venues made it 
more difficult for market makers to use one exchange to undo 
a transaction on another. It also made the task of market 
making more random. A member of the broker-dealer 
community suggested that regulators needed to determine the 
inflection point at which additional trading venues become a 
drag on execution quality (this interviewee speculated that 
four or five venues might be the sweet spot).   
Fragmentation raises interesting issues for any 
application of DLT to stock trading.76 To obtain the full 
measure of DLT’s potential cost savings, all trading of any 
given stock would occur on one DLT-based venue, which, in 
addition to replacing all the current trading venues, would 
automatically do the work of all the various entities currently 
devoted to clearing and settlement, transferring shares, 
maintaining custody, and managing firm corporate stock 
ledgers. Such a transformation within a regulated industry 
such as securities would be no easy task: all these incumbents 
would lose the rents they currently enjoy and would likely 
 
75 See id. 
76 See David C. Donald & Mahdi H. Miraz, Multilateral Transparency 
for Securities Markets Through DLT, 25 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 
107–09 (2019). 
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mount stiff political resistance. Moreover, any market 
structure established by the DLT trading venue would have 
to mediate the same conflicts of interest among different types 
of traders that we see in today’s market. And, as one 
interviewee noted, a single DLT-based venue would be a 
monopoly, meaning it would lack competitive pressure to 
provide customer service and to innovate and would likely 
require some kind of rate regulation to avoid monopoly 
pricing. 
E. Special Regulatory Status of the Stock Exchanges 
The current regulatory structure governing the securities 
markets was established back in the 1930s.77 At that time, each 
U.S. stock exchange was a nonprofit with considerable 
authority over the practices of its broker-dealer members.78 The 
federal securities laws required each exchange to register with 
the SEC and become subject to its supervision and rules.79 But 
each exchange retained its special status as a “self-regulatory 
organization” (SRO), allowing it to continue much of its 
traditional regulatory role, now essentially delegated to it by the 
SEC, and entitling it to certain protections not available to 
broker-dealers.80 Starting in the 1990s, the stock exchanges all 
converted to for-profit institutions, but they were allowed to 
keep their status as SROs.81 As pointed out by one member of 
the regulatory community, the relationship between the 
exchanges and the SEC continues to deteriorate and is 
characterized by extensive legal battles over the very 
authority of the SEC. Also, another member of the regulatory 
community noted that Regulation NMS (Reg NMS) succeeded 
in promoting competition, but now the different kinds of 
 
77 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 272. 
78 See id. at 273 (discussing exchange authority); Reena Aggarwal, 
Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN., Spring 2002, at 105, 105 (discussing the non-profit model). 
79 FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 273. 
80 Id. 
81 See Aggarwal, supra note 78, at 105, 109. 
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trading venues—exchanges versus non-exchange trading 
venues such as dark pools and internalizers—are competing 
on their regulatory burdens,82 and differences in such burdens 
need to be closely examined. 
Any DLT-based system would, for both regulatory and 
speed-of-transactions reasons, probably need a trusted party, 
and this trusted party would raise anew the same kind of 
regulatory issues as the exchanges do today. These include 
whether the system should be a non-profit with broker-dealers 
as members or a for-profit entity, and whether it should have 
SRO status. 
F. The Technological Arms Race 
As noted earlier, various market participants—market 
makers, other high frequency traders, and sophisticated 
brokers placing orders for investors—seek to get, and act 
upon, as quickly as possible data about changes in existing 
quotes and new transactions.83 In their world, victory goes to 
the swift. This prompts a technological arms race that the 
current level of fragmentation fuels by requiring each such 
entity to have an advanced computer located close to each 
exchange’s matching engine (so called “co-location”) and a 
high-speed communications network linking all these co-
located computers.84 These computers then use algorithms to 
decide what quotes to make or cancel and what trades to 
make, all based on the information each receives from its own 
exchange and from the other co-located computers in its 
network.85 One member of the financial services industry 
pointed out that market makers spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars simply to remain defensive and able to quote86—a form 
 
82 For a similar view, see Steven McNamara, The Stock Exchange as 
Multi-Sided Platform and the Future of the National Market System, 2018 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 969, 989–91. 
83 See supra Section V.A. 
84 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 96. 
85 See id. at 95–96. 
86 For an estimate of revenues from market data and co-location, see 
Eric Budish, Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, A Theory of Stock Exchange 
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of competition among HFT market makers that is viewed by 
at least one member of the exchange community as wasteful. 
Another interviewee expressed a similar concern for the costs 
it imposes on fundamental value traders. As a member of the 
broker-dealer community put it, if a broker updates its 
technology once a year, it’s going to be far behind by the 
eleventh month. Having a stock trade exclusively on a single 
DLT-based platform would make much of this costly effort 




G. The Quality of the Market for Large Issuer Stocks 
Versus that for Smaller Issuer Stocks 
One member of the exchange community expressed 
concern that the secondary trading markets function well for 
large corporations, but not as well or as smoothly for smaller 
issuers, which have a much lower trading volume and less 
liquidity.87 The prospect that their shares, if publicly traded, 
would lack high liquidity removes the incentives for many 
startups and smaller corporations to use a public offering as a 
way of raising new capital. Consequently, tech giants such as 
Apple and Google dominate the innovation segment of the 
market.88 Why smaller firms have so much less liquidity is 
 
Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market? 36 tbl.4.2 
(July 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.people.fas.harvard 
.edu/~robinlee/papers/ExchangeComp.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMK2-JEYH]. 
87 See Zumbach, supra note 31, at 442 (linking firm size and trading 
volume). 
88 With about 16.7 billion shares outstanding and a market 
capitalization over $2.1 trillion, Apple sees an average volume of about 100 
million trades. See Apple Inc. Statistics, YAHOO!: FIN., 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/AAPL/key-statistics?p=AAPL 
[https://perma.cc/HAS4-2SGJ] (last visited May 17, 2021). The 
corresponding figures for Alphabet (Google’s parent) are about 323.6 
million, $1.5 trillion, and 1.4 million. Alphabet Inc. Statistics, YAHOO!: FIN., 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOG/key-statistics?p=GOOG 
[https://perma.cc/5HVZ-G3C7] (last visited (May 17, 2021). 
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hotly debated.89 The exchange community member referred to 
above suggested that, under current arrangements, broker-
dealers gain much of their profits from trades of these smaller 
issuers and so tend to resist reform. One member of the 
broker-dealer community attributed the problem to a lack of 
information about smaller issuers. He gave an example: the 
prohibition on advertising through testimonials in the 
Investment Advisers Act90 has disadvantaged innovators, 
who cannot afford to spend as much as incumbents on 
advertising and cannot rely on testimonials, which would be 
the most cost-effective means of advertising.   
The prospect of DLT-based trading raises interesting 
possibilities here. As noted earlier, the scalability issues of 
DLT-based trading are less relevant for smaller, lower-
trading-volume issuers,91 and so the trading of such issuers’ 
shares is a good starting point for DLT. At the same time, 
designing the system to ameliorate the market structure 
issues that may contribute to the problems these issuers have 
on the exchanges might make public offerings more attractive 
to them. 
H. Debt Markets 
Finally, many interviewees expressed concerns about 
inefficiency and lack of transparency in the debt markets. For 
example, one member of the financial services industry 
blamed the lack of such transparency for Lehman’s collapse: 
more transparency would have increased liquidity and given 
the market more faith that the realizable underlying 
fundamental value of Lehman’s assets was sufficient for it to 
meet its obligations. Illiquidity also contributes to volatile 
 
89 See Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Economics of Primary Markets, in 
SECURITIES MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 4, at 34, 74–
75. 
90 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1(b) (2020). 
91 See supra Section IV.B. 
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pricing.92  This interviewee observed that the large margins 
enjoyed by broker-dealers due to the lack of transparency 
reduces any incentive to invest in electronic markets or 
technology, ultimately hurting consumers. Any move toward 
electronic markets is also slowed by the lack of homogeneity 
in bond markets with tens of thousands of individual issues, 
as a member of the broker-dealer community pointed out. 
These concerns were echoed by a member of the regulatory 
community, who worried that Americans tend to turn to debt 
markets as they get older,93 but very high markups and 
spreads make getting cash in or out expensive.   
I. Summation and Questions Going Forward 
In sum, while some agreement emerged that equity 
markets are generally functioning well, at least with respect 
to price discovery, concerns were expressed about a number of 
issues that any development of DLT-based market systems 
will need to carefully consider. As markets become 
increasingly fragmented and complex, are the interests that 
past and present structures were designed to serve still being 
served?  Should they be? To the extent that DLT transforms 
structural operations in markets, can it alleviate some of the 
issues identified in this section? 
VI. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE MARKETS 
Private, rather than public, markets are increasingly 
providing capital:  startups now amass millions, even billions, 
of dollars in venture capital or private equity funding before, 
 
92 See Joshua Mitts, Short and Distort, 49 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 301 
(2020). 
93 See James Poterba et al., Lifecycle Asset Allocation Strategies and 
the Distribution of 401(k) Retirement Wealth 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 11974, 2006), https://www.nber.org/system 
/files/working_papers/w11974/w11974.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C4C-ETC5] 
(noting a weak decline in equity portfolio shares with age). 
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if ever, considering an IPO.94 Indeed, for many that do 
ultimately go public, they no longer do so for the traditional 
reason that the higher liquidity of publicly traded shares 
makes them more valuable and hence that a public offering of 
shares is an attractive way of raising capital. Instead, they go 
public for reasons related to the fact that, with the growth of 
the firm, it has issued stock to many employees.95 Or, as 
unicorns such as Spotify and Slack have done, they go public 
through a direct listing, which raises no capital but, by 
allowing trading of their shares on public markets, allows 
 
94 See Edward F. Greene et al., The Need for a Comprehensive Approach 
to Capital Markets Regulation, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 714. In 2019, for 
example, over $1.5 trillion was reported raised under Regulation D alone, 
which exceeds the $1.2 trillion was raised through registered offerings in 
the same time period. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON REGULATION A / REGULATION D PERFORMANCE 3 (2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/report-congress-regulation-a-d.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VQ6S-78KU]; see also generally DAVID BABOOLALL ET AL., 




review-2021-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HFJ-C3UL] (giving an overview of 
private funding data). 
95 The very number of employee shareholders, if high enough, triggers 
federal securities law disclosure obligations, making the disclosures 
connected with a public offering much less of an additional burden. Even 
without that trigger, these employees will be pushing for their shares to be 
publicly traded so that it is easier for them to cash in. In particular, section 
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires registration by any 
issuer with more than a threshold number of stockholders of record and with 
that registration comes the obligation to provide mandated periodic 
disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (2019). This was a major concern 
which drove both Facebook and Twitter towards IPOs. See, for example, 
Twitter’s request for relief from section 12(g). Letter from Daniel J. 
Winnike, Partner, Fenwick & W. LLP, to Thomas Kim, Off. of Chief Couns., 
Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 6–11 (Aug. 23, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2011/twitter091311-12gh-
incoming.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6CZ-Q43K]. 
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their founders and early investors to sell and reduce risk by 
diversifying their portfolios.96 
A. The Potential Impact of DLT on the Relative Size of 
Private Versus Public Markets 
How might DLT play a role in this divide? In a sense, there 
may be a horse race here, with DLT enhancing the attraction 
of both staying private and going public. On the one hand, 
DLT could significantly improve private market liquidity by 
making it cheaper and easier for qualified buyers and 
sellers—accredited investors—to find each other and have 
their trades cleared and settled.97 It could also make private 
markets more transparent, a concern touched upon in many 
discussions. In support of this view, one interviewee involved 
in private markets noted that blockchain technology—
through smart contracts, for example—can speed up any 
given trade and that smart contracts are already being used 
to facilitate liquidity in private markets.98 The underlying 
technology of DLT, which mediates complex transactions 
efficiently, could also be used to restrict transfers of private 
securities only to those allowed by law or by corporate 
provisions to acquire them. The entrepreneurs of some 
 
96 Greg Rodgers, Marc Jaffe & Benjamin Cohen, Evolving Perspectives 
on Direct Listings After Spotify and Slack, HARV.  L. SCH. F.  ON CORP. 





97 See supra Section IV.A. 
98 See, e.g., Lubin et al., supra note 29 (“Smart contracts are automated 
actions that can be coded and executed once a set of conditions is met. They 
have the ability to remove some of the more manual components of the 
financial industry—such as the process of distributing dividends—by 
placing the execution of the action on the blockchain via automated code, 
instead of in the hands of human operators. . . . [T]he complex process of 
paying out dividends, splits, issue of rights, warrants, pay-ups, and so on, 
now can be automated, resulting in more confidence from investors and a 
much lower margin of error.”). 
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companies would welcome a setting in which their shares 
gained greater liquidity, but where they could still exercise 
some control over the nature of their shareholder base. 
On the other hand, as we have noted above in the 
discussion of market structure,99 there are many ways that a 
DLT-based system might help the public securities markets. 
DLT might persuade companies to go public earlier in their 
lives given that, for scalability reasons, smaller firms are the 
better initial candidates for DLT-based trading.100 Also, as 
some interviewees noted, DLT could make being a public 
company more attractive generally by reducing the 
mechanical costs of distributing dividends and 
announcements to, and soliciting and counting the votes of, 
the much larger number of shareholders that accompanies 
being a public company. 
DLT could also help the public markets by improving the 
disclosure required of public companies. Broadly, the 
backbone of the regulation of publicly traded securities has 
been the mandatory issuer disclosure rules.101 Although they 
are often justified as protecting investors, most scholars 
believe disclosure’s more important function is the promotion 
of accurate share prices.102 This in turn enhances the 
efficiency of the larger economy in a number of ways, 
including by improving corporate governance.  Also, by 
reducing insider trading, disclosure  enhancesliquidity in the 
markets.103 
The prime consumers of disclosure have been professional 
securities analysts who use it to guide the investment funds 
that employ them.104 Traditionally, this disclosure has come 
 
99 Supra Part V. 
100 See supra Section V.G. 
101 See Greene et al., supra note 94, at 717. 
102 See Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic 
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 368 (2003). 
103 On some of these relationships, see generally Merritt B. Fox, 
Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed Trading and Its 
Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817 (2018). 
104 See Fox et al., supra note 102, at 348 n.45. 
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in the form of answers to SEC form questions.105 The issuers 
publish these answers periodically in SEC filings.106 New 
technology related to DLT may allow analysts direct and 
continuous access to raw data from within issuers.107 This 
could both enhance share price accuracy and reduce the 
trading advantages of corporate insiders. The question, 
though, is whether these gains outweigh the costs.  In 
particular, how could issuers protect proprietary information 
from their competitors? And would making this data available 
to highly sophisticated analysts be unfair to other investors? 
To the extent that these factors are indeed problems, could 
new methods of disclosure be designed to minimize them? 
One interviewee from the issuer community suggested 
that, if DLT made private markets more attractive by making 
shares more liquid, private and public markets might be more 
complements than competitors. The idea is that greater 
liquidity in the private market would make the prices there 
more accurately reflect the true value of a firm’s shares. This 
in turn would make a subsequent public offering simpler and 
less risky. Indeed, if the firm and the public market both 
viewed the price discovery capabilities of the private market 
as good enough, the firm might be able to do the public offering 
directly into the market without the intermediation of an 
investment bank. This is because an important function of the 
bank in such an offering is to reduce the risk associated with 
choosing the initial price—one that is neither too low and 
hence leaves money on the table, nor too high so that many of 
the offered shares go unsold—and doing so in a way that puts 
the bank’s money where its mouth is.108 
 
105 See, e.g., generally The Coca-Cola Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 
(Feb. 25, 2021) (providing such disclosures). 
106 See, e.g., generally id. 
107 Cf. Jesse Marks, Distributed Ledger Technologies and Corruption 
the Killer App, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 42, 78–80 (2018) (describing 
some of the private sector monitoring uses of DLT). 
108 In a firm commitment underwriting, the investment bank buys all 
the shares being offered from the issuer at the offering price minus a 
discount. Thus, the bank takes the risk if the price is too high and the 
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B. Issues Related to the Public/Private Market Divide 
To fully understand how using DLT in private or public 
markets might affect the divide between the two requires a 
discussion of how the divide is currently viewed. Because 
private firms are not subject to mandatory disclosure 
requirements, some interviewees with regulatory experience 
expressed the fear that, with larger and larger firms staying 
private, we lose the corporate governance benefits of public 
markets. One member of the investment industry argued, 
however, that private markets were actually better at 
creating value and strengthening corporate governance. The 
argument is that index funds typically pay little attention to 
corporate governance but hold an increasing percentage of 
public company shares, so companies are generally being 
subject to less shareholder monitoring. In contrast, private 
equity firms play a much greater role in running a company 
and improving corporate governance, largely because they are 
not burdened by liquidity concerns and friction (no material 
nonpublic information concerns, lock-up periods, etc.).109 As a 
result, there are fewer principal-agent issues, which has 
incentivized many companies to remain private—rather than 
going public with absentee shareholders. Moreover, this 
interviewee believed that competition between private equity 
firms and other investors made valuations more robust in 
private markets.   
But other interviewees disagreed, saying some private 
valuations are illogical and citing WeWork as an example.110 
 
offering does not sell out. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social 
Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Price, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1011–12 (1992). 
109 For a summary of similar distinctions drawn in the literature by 
some, see, for example, Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, 
Shareholder Value(s): Inded Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial 
Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1258–65 (2020). 
110 See Liz Hoffman & Maureen Farrell, WeWork’s Valuation Falls to 
$8 Billion Under SoftBank Rescue Offer, WALL ST. J. (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-
offers-to-put-6-5b-into-wework-including-5b-loan-11571687872 (last 
updated Oct. 21, 2019). 
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A member of the investment community blamed venture 
capital for contributing to price inaccuracy, noting that 
venture funds were trying to undercut competitors at an 
unsustainable level. If relatively inefficient private markets 
are growing more than relatively efficient public markets, 
that could lead to problems for society, the interviewees said, 
with inferior projects receiving scarce capital that could have 
gone to more promising ones. 
Whether private markets or public markets produce higher 
returns was another point of disagreement. For example, one 
member of the regulatory community thought private equity 
generally earned higher returns, even after adjustment for 
higher risk, while another member of the regulatory 
community did not think so. This disagreement is important 
because, as discussed below, one of the main arguments for 
giving ordinary investors more access to private markets is 
that they are currently being denied these higher returns.111 
Interviewees also disagreed about why the private markets 
were growing. Two members of the investment and exchange 
communities believed that costs were a significant deterrent 
to going public. A member of the regulatory community said 
that, while individual disclosure requirements were 
justifiable, in total they could be so burdensome that they also 
deterred companies from going public. Similarly, a former 
regulator said that “overregulation” in public markets, and 
the ubiquity of litigation,112 slowed progress and innovation. 
Yet another regulator expressed the opposite view: it is not 
the SEC’s job to encourage additional IPOs, and, in any event, 
choosing to go public is an existential decision for a firm, and 
the amount of regulation or legal paperwork is not a true 
obstacle for a firm that wants to make this transformation. A 
member of the investment industry agreed that disclosure and 
 
111 See infra Part VII. 
112 Securities class action filings fell in 2020 but generally have been 
increasing over time. See CORNERSTONE RSCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
FILINGS: 2020 YEAR IN REVIEW 5 fig.4 (2020), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-
Filings-2020-Year-in-Review [https://perma.cc/C5YK-VFMF]. 
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compliance costs were not a meaningful burden and said that, 
in fact, heads of corporations hid behind this complaint when 
what they really did not like was the scrutiny that they 
received as a result of the rules. Interestingly, one member of 
the issuer community suggested that, although his firm 
viewed required disclosure as simply a cost worth incurring 
when it went public, preparing periodic disclosures actually 
helped the firm manage its affairs. Coming at the issue from 
the other side, one interviewee from the legal community felt 
that the SEC, in an effort to promote startups and the like, 
went too far in allowing firms to raise capital without 
engaging in a registered public offering and its extensive 
disclosure requirements.   
Interviewees also raised questions about the kinds of 
information that public firms are required to disclose. At least 
one member of the legal community remarked on the 
importance of forward-looking disclosures, which are not 
required,113 although they also acknowledged their 
drawbacks—e.g., their particular potential to mislead. 
Another interviewee, a member of the regulatory community, 
thought that some disclosure requirements might be 
irrelevant to investment decisions and further cluttered 
already dense disclosure documents. 
A member of the regulatory community suggested that the 
growth of the private markets helps to hold the SEC 
accountable. The SEC is concerned that some firms are losing 
out on the improved liquidity of the public markets because 
they view the accompanying regulation as too burdensome to 
be worthwhile.114 This puts pressure on the SEC and 
Congress to redesign certain regulations like “random” rules 
 
113 The Exchange Act deals with forward-looking statements in section 
21E. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (2019). Firms do need to make disclosures about 
certain trends “known to management.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2020). 
114 See, e.g., Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli & Vladimir Ivanov, 
Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered 
Securities Offerings, 2009‐2017 5 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/files 
/DERA%20white%20paper_Regulation%20D_082018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7XZH-BAA8]. 
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about CEO-to-median-worker pay ratios and conflict minerals 
that can discourage companies from going public.115   
Another member of the financial services industry 
suggested that DLT could allow regulators to “look under the 
hood” of the way private markets operate, where a variety of 
new practices are a source of concern to many commentators. 
Information about those markets has traditionally been hard 
to come by because of the very fact that they are private.116 
For example, with DLT it could become much easier for 
regulators to determine whether private-market investors 
actually qualify as accredited investors. One member of the 
regulatory community, however, played down concern with 
what is going on in the private markets, stressing that many 
of the new approaches to capital raising and trading that 
disturb some commentators are still largely funneled through 
broker-dealers, who remain subject to SEC scrutiny.117   
C. Summary and Questions Going Forward 
In sum, there is significant disagreement about whether 
the rise of private markets is desirable. Some applaud private 
markets for their value-creation potential, while many others 
are concerned about their lack of transparency and 
requirements for issuer disclosure and would alter regulations 
to encourage more companies to go public. A few questions in 
particular stand out going forward. Can DLT narrow 
differences in the amount of information available in private 
and public markets? Can DLT alleviate concerns around 
private market growth and access to investors, and can it 
streamline disclosure obligations for companies considering 
going public? 
 
115 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Regulation of Primary Markets, in 
SECURITIES MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 4, at 101, 
134–37. 
116 Id. at 125–26. 
117 On broker regulation in this context, see id. at 127. 
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VII. THE ORDINARY INVESTOR 
Closely tied to the above discussion is the role of ordinary 
“unsophisticated” investors, who have long had a fraught 
history with equity investing. As multiple interviewees have 
observed, DLT could either ameliorate or significantly 
exacerbate these problems. What happens depends largely on 
whether DLT can expand ordinary investors’ access to 
information that is meaningful to them in their choice of 
investments. 
All else equal, access to a broad range of equities is good 
for an investor because it improves their range of investment 
and savings options. All is not equal, however, because most 
ordinary investors lack much relevant information and the 
time and skill to analyze the information they do have—a 
concern raised, for example, by one member of the broker-
dealer community. A former regulator went further, 
questioning the wisdom of letting retail investors participate 
in non-index-fund markets given their ignorance of the 
complexity of modern markets,118 especially in light of 
technological changes such as the rise of HFTs and 
algorithmic trading. 
Ordinary investors have relatively open access to stocks 
trading in the public markets.119  These markets, and the 
issuers of the stocks that trade in them, are heavily regulated, 
in part to protect ordinary investors from fraud and risks they 
otherwise might not anticipate.120 The private markets are 
much more lightly regulated, but access to them is restricted, 
and they exclude many ordinary investors.121 Debate 
continues over whether this structure gets things right. Does 
it, for example, unnecessarily exclude ordinary investors from 
 
118 See Bruce Ian Carlin & Gustavo Manso, Obfuscation, Learning, and 
the Evolution of Investor Sophistication, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 754, 754–55, 
757–58 (2011). 
119 Cf. Hanley, supra note 89, at 38. 
120 See id. at 49. 
121 See id. at 88. 
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the most lucrative investment opportunities?122 One former 
regulator worried that it does and therefore disserves the 
American public. Or are these superior opportunities a myth? 
Would investors benefit from wider access to the private 
markets or simply be exposed to more fraud and 
unanticipated risk? Both a regulator and a member of the 
investment community thought that giving ordinary investors 
more access to private markets might create an adverse 
selection problem, allowing venture and private capital firms 
to pick off the better offerings and leave retail investors with 
the rest.123 That regulator and another one expressed serious 
reservations about brokers who connect investors with private 
market offerings, noting that they were the brokers subject to 
the most complaints. The recent expansion of private 
markets—where some “unicorn” startups have rewarded their 
venture capitalist and private-equity firm investors 
astonishing returns124—makes answering these questions 
increasingly urgent.   
 
122 Even with the availability of regulatory relief allowing a broad 
marketing of a company’s securities without needing to file a disclosure-
oriented registration statement, private issuers seem to have limited 
appetites for retail investment. The JOBS Act introduced Rule 506(c) in 
2013, allowing private issuers to engage in general solicitation without any 
disclosure as long as the actual purchasers of the offered securities are 
“accredited,” a category based on income and wealth that, while cutting out 
a substantial majority of U.S. households, does not cut out a very high 
percentage of what would be most of the market, i.e., households that 
actually directly own public company stock. See Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 
313–14 (2012) (requiring a change in the rule); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) 
(2020) (giving the lenient “accredited investor” definition for natural 
persons). Eight years later, 506(c) offerings remain a small fraction (four 
percent) of all Regulation D offerings. SCOTT BAUGUESS, RACHITA 
GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS 




123 For similar reasoning, see Greene et al., supra note 94, at 717. 
124 See, e.g., Heather Somerville, Tech IPO Bonanza Yields Riches for 
Venture-Capital Firms, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2020, 5:09 PM), 
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A few interviewees—ranging from investment industry 
individuals to legal professionals and regulators—thought 
retail investors might safely participate in private markets by 
investing in publicly traded funds that in turn invest in the 
private market.125 Retail investors would get access to private 
markets but delegate the choice of assets to better informed 
fund managers. This investment vehicle could be structured 
as either an open-end or closed-end mutual fund.126 At least 
one member of the investment community was skeptical of the 
open-end option, which would allow the investor to redeem her 
investment at any time for what the fund deemed her share of 
the fund’s total value, posing valuation problems for both the 
mutual fund in terms of its portfolio structure as well as for 
the investor in terms of the fair value of her redemption.127 
This interviewee believed that the illiquid nature of 
investments in private companies created too much risk for 




125 See John Finley, Expanding Retail Access to Private Markets 10–
11 (Nov. 2019), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/sbcfac/expanding-retail-
access-to-private-markets-finley.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TPK-PARR]. 
126 Mutual fund investment in private equity has been rising. Between 
2014 and 2016, twenty-five percent of VC-backed IPOs enjoyed some mutual 
fund financing, compared to ten percent in the 1990s. See Sungjoung Kwon, 
Michelle Lowry & Yiming Qian, Mutual Fund Investments in Private Firms, 
136 J. FIN. ECON. 407, 409 (2020). Between 2011 and 2016, mutual funds 
provided an average of thirty-eight percent (median of thirty-two percent) 
of venture capital in the rounds in which they participated. Id. at 408. 
127 The illiquidity of private equity causes valuation problems when 
such redemptions occur. The mutual fund may find it difficult to value its 
private equity assets in order to comply with fifteen-percent the holding 
limits in illiquid assets set by Rule 22e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(4), 
while the redeeming investor may decide (perhaps with the benefit of 
hindsight) that the redemption price is inaccurate and seek action against 
the mutual fund. Illiquid private equity assets are valued infrequently and 
often inconsistently, which make such valuation problems inevitable. See 
Vikas Agarwal et al., Private Company Valuations by Mutual Funds 3–5 
(Feb. 20, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3066449. 
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the fair value of the investor’s share would be a problem, too. 
Probably because of these concerns, mutual funds, despite 
investing in private equity more than before, in practice stay 
far below the fifteen percent regulatory limit set by Rule 22e-
4.128 
The alternative, which avoids these problems, is a closed-
end fund, where the investor, unlike with the open-end fund, 
cannot redeem the share with the issue and can cash out only 
by selling her share of the fund in the secondary trading 
market. This arrangement, though, creates its own risks 
because the pricing of the closed-end shares in the secondary 
market is likely to be based on far less information concerning 
the underlying operating private firm investments than is the 
case with the pricing of shares of a publicly traded operating 
firm. The investor would thus need to rely on what she can 
ascertain about the skills and integrity of the closed-end 
fund’s managers, and would have no power, based on results, 
to discipline the managers by withdrawing from the fund as 
she could do in the case of an open-end fund. One question for 
the closed-end approach would be whether a DLT-based 
system could somehow make more information available to 
the market about a fund’s underlying private operating firm 
investments so that secondary market pricing would be more 
reliable.   
Expanding the definition of an accredited investor is 
another potential way to open private markets to more 
investors. Some interviewees suggested redefining the term to 
include persons who establish a certain level of investment 
sophistication but do not meet the current income or net worth 
standards.129  However, one former regulator proposed going 
 
128 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(4). The median mutual fund invests only 
0.71% of assets in private equity. See Katie Rushkewicz Reichart, Unicorn 
Hunting: Large-Cap Funds That Dabble in Private Companies, 
MORNINGSTAR (June 3, 2018) (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/867995/unicorn-hunting-
large-cap-funds-that-dabble-in-private-companies. 
129 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Modernizes 
the Accredited Investor Definition (Aug. 26, 2020), 
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further and opening private markets to any investor who used 
a broker, under the theory that the broker would understand 
the risks involved and would be bound by Regulation Best 
Interest to communicate this to the investor.130   
This discussion ties into a few broader debates about the 
economy. Market index funds and robo-advisers may, at 
affordable cost, increase the range of equities in which the 
savings of ordinary investors can be intelligently invested and 
provide vehicles for diversifying risk, thus justifying retail 
investor money directly or indirectly going to a broader range 
of companies than are currently public.131 Yet, whether these 
new features of the market are really helping ordinary 
investors is an open question. In particular, even if they 
appear to work under normal circumstances, are they prone 
to failure in extreme circumstances, thereby introducing 
systemic risk into the economy and imposing losses at the 
worst time on those least able to afford them?  One member of 
the broker-dealer community in particular worried that 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) would expose retail investors 
to volatility in times of stress, as they would all move together 
and investors would seek to exit simultaneously. 
In sum, little agreement exists as to the ideal amount of 
access that retail investors should safely have to equities 
markets—private or public. While it is conceivable that their 
lack of access to private markets systematically excludes them 
from lucrative investments, this is far from clear.  Many 
regulators and market participants questioned the feasibility 
of providing ordinary investors with access to private markets 
 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-191 [https://perma.cc/87NQ-
K3FJ] (using professional certification as a proxy for sophistication). 
The SEC has noted that only thirteen percent of U.S. households meet the 
criteria to be accredited investors. See Amending the “Accredited Investor” 
Definition, 85 Fed. Reg. 2,574, 2,600 (proposed Jan. 15, 2020) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 230, 240). 
According to a DERA white paper, only nine percent of Regulation D 
offerings between 2009 and 2017 included non-accredited investors. 
BAUGESS ET AL., supra note 122, at 34. 
130 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15l-1(a). 
131 On robo-advising, see infra Section VIII.B. 
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while protecting them from fraud. More broadly, their very 
ability to understand the complexity of modern markets was 
raised as a concern. 
VIII. INTERMEDIARIES 
One broad theme emerges on the topic of intermediaries: 
currently we rely on human intermediaries as the front-line 
against wrongdoing in the market. As one regulator argued, 
we should not give up the oversight of the markets that comes 
through the SEC’s regulation of broker-dealers unless we are 
certain something better is taking its place. 
A. The Shrinking Role of Brokers for Ordinary 
Investors 
Most significantly, DLT and AI could accelerate the 
decrease in the role of retail brokers as a main source of an 
individual’s investment advice.132 Currently, all transactions 
in markets must be done through a broker because the broker, 
which is supposed to know its customer, provides a backstop 
to assure that a trade closes should the customer not follow 
through.133 As discussed earlier, DLT presents the possibility, 
for example, of a clearing and settlement mechanism that does 
not rely on a customer’s broker to assure the customer’s 
performance.134 In that case, the fear that a trader will not 
perform would no longer be a reason to prevent traders from 
direct access to exchanges. Similarly, AI-based programs 
could guide investors as to what to invest in and how to 
execute their trades—functions also traditionally performed 
by brokers.135   
 
132 On the decline of retail brokers, see Regulation Best Interest: The 
Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,411–13 (July 
12, 2019) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
133 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 20. 
134 See, e.g., Lubin et al., supra note 29. 
135 See infra Section VIII.B. It should be noted, however, that one 
former regulator thought that the greatest threat posed by DLT would be 
more to transfer agents, such as DTCC, than to brokers. 
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Further, it is possible that DLT, combined with AI-based 
programs, could completely remove the need for not only retail 
brokers, but also ETFs and mutual funds. The combination 
could make transacting frequently, in even slivers of 
investment, nearly costless. And AI-based robo-investing 
could guide what purchases and sales should be made and 
how to execute them at the best prices. 
B. Redefinition of Duties 
As intermediaries increasingly rely on computers to give 
investment advice to, and make investment decisions for, 
investors, questions abound as to their duties to customers.136 
In 2017, the SEC issued guidance stating that, if structured 
properly, a digital adviser could be a fiduciary under the 
Adviser’s Act without the need to create new rules.137 The 
scope of such guidance still needs to be fleshed out, and 
markets and regulators are still learning, as one member of 
the broker-dealer community informed us. More existentially, 
that interviewee argued that a computer can know its client 
quite well given its ability to sort and process huge amounts 
of data. 
However, the importance of human intermediaries should 
not be understated—a theme that emerged out of multiple 
interviews. One regulator was skeptical that the SEC would 
ever tolerate no role for human intermediaries. That same 
interviewee emphasized that, for example, even with AI-based 
investing, mechanisms for regulatory oversight were still 
robust because the humans that created the computer 
programs were still subject to such oversight. Another former 
regulator acknowledged that it was reasonable that the SEC 
 
136 See, e.g., Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice 
Across the Financial Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 716–19 (2018); 
Jake G. Rifkin, Comment, Robo-Advisers Jumping on the Bandwagon: Yet 
Another Cry for a Uniform Standard, 97 N.C. L. REV. 673, 674–675 (2019). 
137 See Rifkin, supra note 136, at 675 (citing DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ROBO-ADVISERS 1–2 (2017), https://www.sec.gov 
/investment/im-guidance-2017-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU3S-N5CM]). 
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might want to retain intermediaries as the main points of 
regulation.   
These debates occur against a broader backdrop of 
uncertainty around a broker’s duty. For example, multiple 
interviewees thought the concept of best execution138 needs 
clearer guidance. One member of the exchange community 
specifically thought that best execution was too vague a 
concept, hampering FINRA’s enforcement, and expressed the 
view that Regulation Best Interest should go further. In this 
context, one question is whether DLT could provide needed 
transparency and clarity as to when a broker was, and was 
not, achieving best execution.   
On a separate front, one member of the legal community 
expressed concerns about the growth of intermediaries in the 
form of private equity funds, which raise their funds pursuant 
to exemptions from the public offering disclosure regime and 
have sufficiently few investors to avoid most other 
regulations.139 These intermediaries receive funds from 
institutions or wealthy individuals and then invest that 
money in debt or equity securities of private companies. He 
asserted that the total volume of the investments of such 
funds exceed the total of corporate bank lending.   
C. Conclusion 
In sum, while interviewees acknowledged the potential of 
DLT to obviate the need for intermediaries, significant 
questions remain as to whether doing so is wise or whether 
regulators would be comfortable with such a world, given the 
traditional focus on intermediaries as the front-line target for 
regulators in policing wrongdoing. Thus a number of 
questions remain: is a system entirely without intermediaries 
possible? Is it desirable? What concerns would need to be 
addressed before transitioning to such a system? 
 
138 On this duty, see FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 265–67. 
139 See Langevoort, supra note 115, at 134–36. 
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IX. WRONGDOING 
As alluded to in previous sections, traditional methods of 
discipline in the securities markets focused on disclosure and 
human intermediaries. For example, our current regulatory 
structure relies heavily on brokers to be the front-line soldiers 
in the battle against insider and manipulative trading by their 
customers.140 How might the regulatory system need to 
change if brokers drop out of the equation? Could DLT, with 
its recordkeeping capabilities, offer the means for effective 
oversight? Could it also help in providing authorities data 
needed to reduce systemic risk? 
The laws around insider trading and market manipulation 
are already rife with uncertainties. Courts lack clear 
legislative mandates and are instead simply guided by a small 
number of very generally worded anti-fraud provisions.141 As 
a result, the courts have been forced to develop in common-
law fashion ways of distinguishing trading-profit-motivated, 
but socially useful, transactions from practices that simply 
move money to those who are most artful in what they say or 
how they trade.142 Technological advancements expand the 
menu of possible transactions that need to be distinguished in 
these ways. For example, HFTs, who depend on ultra-fast 
communication with diverse trading venues and employ 
algorithmic quoting and trading decisiomaking, appear to 
have enhanced liquidity in the markets.143 They are also 
capable of a variety of socially negative trading strategies, 
however.144   
Innovation in markets is only accelerating. Not many years 
ago, the SEC struggled to craft responsive rules, Reg NMS, in 
 
140 Cf., e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. 
Rauterberg, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 67, 77 (2018) (noting that brokers are the 
most common defendants in manipulation cases). 
141 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020) (broadly prohibiting fraud); 
FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 162–99 (discussing informed trading). 
142 See FOX ET AL., supra note 3, at 174–75. 
143 See id. at 96, 104. 
144 Id. at 124. 
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anticipation of the advent of HFTs, and yet there are already 
complaints, as noted above, that our current market-structure 
rules are obsolete.145 The line has grown increasingly blurry 
between socially beneficial transactions that tend to make 
prices more accurate and markets more liquid, and 
transactions that should fall under our prohibitions against 
insider trading or manipulation.   
One member of the regulatory community warned of the 
ensuing dangers: if regulators themselves are unsure of the 
line, how can market participants calibrate their behavior 
accordingly? A member of the investment community 
expressed skepticism of regulators’ ability to stay on top of 
technological innovation, especially as so many laws around 
wrongdoing depend on identifying intent, an increasingly 
murky concept given the rise of AI. This is exacerbated, that 
interviewee pointed out, by the disparities in defining or 
reconciling wrongdoing across jurisdictions.146 
Against this changing background in terms of the 
possibilities for wrongdoing, a few questions arise with 
respect to DLT, both positive and negative. If the system 
moves toward DLT-based trading, how can it be designed to 
facilitate enforcement through, for example, recordkeeping 
and audit trails that associate particular trades with 
particular traders? Would using DLT to its full potential 
interfere with enforcement by removing human 
intermediaries that have traditionally provided regulatory 
hooks for enforcement agencies? And will some of the 
efficiency gains offered by a DLT-based trading system need 
to be foregone in order to keep some enforcement-enhancing 
human involvement? 
 
145 See supra Part V. 
146 See, e.g., 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 12:52, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020) (discussing 
variations in the scienter standard under Rule 10b-5). 
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X. DIGITAL COINS 
One already-significant application of DLT with securities 
law implications is the digital coin. Bad actors promoted an 
initial wave of offerings not registered under the Securities 
Act of 1933 that turned out to be rampant frauds designed to 
take advantage of the speculative fever surrounding 
Bitcoin.147 Uncertainty around the status of cryptocurrency 
under the securities laws148 probably reduced the 
effectiveness of these laws in preventing such offerings. 
According to one former regulator, this initial wave of fraud 
has generated great regulatory suspicion of digital coins in 
general. Another former regulator expressed the concern that 
this suspicion could choke, or drive abroad, possibly socially-
beneficial digital-coin-based innovation. In this regulator’s 
mind, too little attention has been paid to the potentially 
positive impact of DLT. 
Securities regulation as currently interpreted by the SEC 
has not fully adapted to the fact that digital coins are 
fundamentally different from equities. On the one hand, what 
is initially offered is very much like an equity security: the 
offeror is issuing the item in order to raise money for a project 
based on its efforts and, if the efforts are successful, the item 
will be worth more in the future than its offering price.149 
Thus, the initial offering itself needs to be regulated very 
much like an offering of stock. This way fraud can be 
prevented and investors can receive enough information to 
sort the more promising offerings from the less promising 
ones.  On the other hand, if the coin is a success, its ultimate 
function is very different from that of an equity security, and 
the regulation of its trading, if any, should probably be outside 
the scope of the securities regulation regime.150 Multiple 
 
147 See Shaanan Cohney et al., Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. 
REV. 591, 596 & n.18 (2019). 
148 See id. at 608. 
149 See id. at 600. 
150 See, e.g., Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital 
Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-
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members of the regulatory community noted this particular 
regulatory problem. As another put it, the SEC decided digital 
coins were securities because it wanted to properly regulate 
their public offerings, but it has not fully thought through the 
other implications of declaring them securities. 
To this point, one interviewee from the regulatory 
community explained that, while many in that community 
think that the securities laws are flexible enough to 
accommodate coins, this interviewee disagreed. The 
interviewee suggested instead a regulatory safe harbor, which 
would provide time for an innovator to build the token 
network until the token no longer ran afoul of securities laws. 
Another interviewee suggested that a whole new regulatory 
agency was needed that would not have the inherited 
traditional securities mindset that pervades the SEC. 
XI. REGULATORY LEARNING 
A major theme arising from our interviews with regulators 
and industry participants alike is that regulatory 
fragmentation and regulators’ slow reactions are stifling 
potential innovation, digital coins being just one case in point. 
Most interviewees, when asked, saw potentially significant 
applications of DLT technology, but noted that unclear 
regulations and uncertain enforcement can scare innovators 
and dissuade market participants from investing in socially 
beneficial technology. As multiple interviewees said, until 
regulators foster blockchain-based systems by pushing 
incumbents to cooperate in adopting them and by providing 
regulatory relief where, applied to DLT, existing regulations 
serve no purpose, players in the financial markets will never 
make the investments necessary to take full advantage of 
blockchain technology.  Regulators’ attitude toward 
innovation needs to fundamentally change, these 
 
investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets [https://perma.cc/Y76Y-6M3M] 
(last modified Apr. 3, 2019) (distinguishing for regulatory purposes coin 
offerings involving classic capital-raising features from other coin offerings). 
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interviewees say.  This requires, among other things, more 
“technologists” at higher levels in the SEC. 
One regulator—while acknowledging the significant 
potential of DLT to transform securities markets—
commented that regulatory fragmentation and complexity are 
disproportionately burdensome for smaller innovators, who 
usually lack the resources to navigate such complexity.   
One member of the broker-dealer community thought that 
regulations that impact on the use of DLT should be based 
more on principles and updated frequently. However, there 
may be a clash of cultures here. As one member of the 
regulatory community explained, it is not easy to convince the 
SEC to give prospective policy guidance in a changing 
landscape—regulators may be much more comfortable 
making policy through ex-post enforcement. However, not 
every interviewee was so critical of the SEC in this regard. 
One member of the broker-dealer community thought that 
regulators had demonstrated openness to innovation and 
willingness to learn about new technology such as robo-
advising, pointing to the SEC’s approach to cybersecurity 
regulations—publishing principles-based guidance that is 
then iteratively refined151—as promising. Regulatory 
sandboxes, where select players are given regulatory relief for 
a period of time but monitored to see how things turn out, 
have also been mentioned as possible ways to make regulators 
more comfortable with innovation.152 However, concerns were 
raised that regulators would not have adequate resources to 
monitor companies’ activities in sandboxes. Interestingly, one 
member of the investment community thought that it was 
more difficult to petition the SEC for permission to do 
something unusual in the United States than it was to 
petition regulators in other jurisdictions, and so a study of the 
 
151 See Cybersecurity, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/9BPV-BCG7] 
(collecting and updating SEC cybersecurity guidance). 
152 For an overview of regulatory sandboxes, see Chris Brummer & 
Yesha Yedav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 291–
97 (2019). 
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successes and failures of sandboxes in these other 
jurisdictions would be worthwhile.   
The industry’s distrust of regulators’ technological 
capacity is also a significant impediment to progress. The 
debate around source code reflects this, as one former 
regulator told us: Regulation Automated Trading originally 
proposed that HFTs reveal their source code, but this received 
major criticism because the industry did not trust the 
government with members’ source code—even in light of a 
subpoena or court order.153 
Looming over these issues is the failure of a fragmented 
regulatory system to keep pace, and the resulting negative 
repercussions for overall economic efficiency. For example, 
conversations with regulators revealed concerns that the SEC 
is ill-equipped to address antitrust issues raised by the 
concentration of shareholder power in a few massive 
institutional investors,154 while the FTC and DOJ, America’s 
traditional antitrust regulators, are not qualified to address 
securities issues. Similar problems may arise if DLT-based 
trading creates some kind of monopoly. Other interviewees 
raised the example of FINRA lacking adequate reach into the 
futures markets even though manipulative schemes can 
easily involve an interaction between the futures and 
securities markets. From an industry standpoint, one member 
of the broker-dealer community explained that, though the 
goal was to make sure all relevant regulators were 
comfortable, identifying the proper regulator was sometimes 
difficult. But whether regulatory consolidation would help is 
unclear. One regulator suggested that fragmented regulators 
can learn from each other’s mistakes, and another member of 
the regulatory community questioned the wisdom of 
 
153 Gregory Meyer, US Regulator Declares ‘Dead’ Moves To Seize HFT 
Code, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017) (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review), https://www.ft.com/content/068ce050-a922-11e7-93c5-
648314d2c72c. 
154 On this concentration, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of 
Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk, 2021 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 606 & n.6. 
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combining the SEC and CFTC because they regulate very 
different markets. Yet two other regulators thought 
fragmentation was clearly harmful and did not think that 
agencies would work together better until Congress changed 
its system having a different committee oversee each agency, 
with each jealously guarding its prerogatives.   
Other regulators raised concerns that SEC enforcement is 
hampered by its slow adjustment to both technological change 
and globalization. As one member of the regulatory 
community put it, very few people at the SEC are skilled in 
programming and handling big data or DLT, and, as a result, 
they may not realize that they can be flying blind with respect 
to important kinds of activities in need of regulation. Another 
suspected that the SEC and FINRA will need to hire technical 
auditors.   
Finally, the design of the right securities regulatory 
reaction to the potential for DLT cannot be based on the 
assumption that the U.S. market exists in isolation from the 
rest of the world. Technology has made it far easier to invest 
in the stocks of foreign issuers and, following the advice of 
financial economists, a larger and larger portion of U.S. 
individual investors’ portfolios is composed of foreign 
stocks.155 But even where the foreign companies in which 
Americans invest are registered under the U.S. securities 
laws, problems remain. As one member of the regulatory 
community noted, regulators lack effective ways to obtain the 
audit papers of corporations in many countries in order to 
detect fraud against U.S. investors. Nor did this interviewee 
like the idea of allowing companies in which Americans invest 
to simply comply with the rules of foreign jurisdictions, which 
he feared would lead to a race to the bottom. This underlines 
the importance of cooperation among regulators around the 
globe if the issues raised by DLT are to be effectively dealt 
with.   
 
155 See Nicolas Coeurdacier & Hélène Rey, Home Bias in Open 
Economy Financial Macroeconomics, 51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 63, 63–67 
(2012) (noting a gradual decline in portfolio “home bias” over time). 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
Our Stakeholder Survey interviews have introduced and 
explored a rich variety of issues faced by securities markets 
regarding the possible uses of DLT. While it is easy to imagine 
many ways that DLT could transform the securities markets, 
the future is not clear. Some of the uncertainty is due to 
simply not knowing whether the technology is really 
applicable in the ways, and with the advantages, imagined. 
Part, though, will depend on the reactions of regulators. Can 
they get out of the way where an existing regulation would 
impede DLT’s utilization and the regulation’s application to 
the DLT-based practice serves no useful purpose? Can they 
step in with new regulation where DLT would permit the 
evasion of rules that currently achieve worthwhile aims? And 
can they nudge the incumbent players, who have established 
patterns of interaction in making the current market function, 
to cooperate to make work whatever new DLT-based systems 
in fact turn out to be practical and socially desirable? 
XIII. APPENDICES 
Appendix A: June 25, 2019 Roundtable Attendees 
Mary Ann Callahan – Managing Director, Office of Technology 
 Architecture, State Street Corporation 
Robert Farrokhnia – Adjunct Associate Professor of Business, 
 Columbia Business School 
Yulia Guseva – Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School 
Jared Herman – President, Hedgebay Securities LLC 
Reynolds Holding – Senior Fellow, Columbia Law School 
Jared Klee – Blockchain Offering Manager, Digital Assets, 
 IBM 
Chuin Lee – Managing Director, Bank of America 
Pam Marcogliese – Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
Will Martino – Founder & CEO, Kadena 
Ryne Miller – Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 
Joshua Mitts – Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law 
 School 
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Justin Schmidt – Head of Digital Asset Markets, Goldman 
 Sachs 
Rosie Shen – Goldman Sachs 
Drew Van der Werff – Goldman Sachs 
David Wishnick – Academic Fellow, University of 
 Pennsylvania Law School 
Appendix B: Survey Interviews Conducted to Date 
Program in the Law and Economics of Capital Markets as of 
February 21, 2021: Interviews Conducted (Positions as of the 
Date of the Interview) 
 
Erkin Adylov – Founder and CEO, Behavox 
Ben Alden – Former Chief Legal Officer & General Counsel, 
 Betterment LLC; Chief Risk Officer, Vanguard 
Amar Amlani – Executive Director, Goldman Sachs 
Elita Ariaz – Legal Executive Superintendent - Business, 
 Banco Santander 
Marcelo Barbosa – President, Comissão de Valores Mobiliários 
 (CVM) (the Brazilian Securities Commission) 
Brandon Becker – Managing Director & Deputy General 
 Counsel, The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
Ken Bensten – President and CEO, SIFMA 
Ran Ben-Tzur – Partner, Fenwick & West 
Max Berger – Founding Partner, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & 
Grossmann 
Edward Bernard – Chairman of Asset Management Advisory 
 Committee, SEC 
Ken Bertsch – Executive Director, Council for Institutional 
 Investors 
Michael Brown – Partner, Fenwick & West 
Chris Brummer – Professor, Georgetown Law 
Doug Cifu – CEO, Virtu Financial Inc. 
Jay Clayton – Former Chair, SEC 
Diwa Cody – Broker, Goldman Sachs 
Robert Cohen – Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell and Former 
 Chief of Cyber Enforcement Unit, SEC 
Bob Colby – Chief Legal Officer, FINRA 
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Chris Concannon – President and COO, MarketAxess 
Benjamin Connault – Economist, IEX 
Robert Cook – President & CEO, FINRA 
John Cosenza – Head of Americas Electronic Trading, 
 Goldman Sachs 
Abe Curdumi – CEO, 5th Street Advisors 
Dorothy DeWitt – Director, Division of Market Oversight, 
 CFTC 
Jim Doty – Former Chairman, PCAOB 
Amy Edwards – Assistant Director, Division of Economic and 
 Risk Analysis, SEC 
Shelley Eleby – Director, Clearpool Group 
Nigel Faulkner – Head of Global Technology/CTO, T. Rowe  
 Price 
Adam Fliss – General Counsel, TPG Capital 
Dan Gallagher – Partner, WilmerHale and Former 
 Commissioner, SEC 
Tyler Gellasch – Executive Director, Healthy Markets 
 Association 
Gustavo Gonzalez – Director, Comissão de Valores Mobiliários  
 (CVM) 
Adrian Griffiths – Assistant General Counsel, CBOE Global 
 Markets 
Frank Hatheway – Former Chief Economist, NASDAQ OMX 
 Group Inc. 
Jared Herman – President, Hedgebay Securities LLC 
Bill Hinman – Director, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC 
Melissa Hinmon – Director of Equity Trading, Glenmede  
 Investment Management 
Christopher Iacovella – CEO, American Securities Association 
Adam Inzirillo – Head of U.S. Equities, CBOE 
Robert Jackson – Commissioner, SEC 
Marc Jaffe – Partner, Latham & Watkins 
Jim Katzman – Former Partner, Goldman Sachs 
Dennis Kelleher – President & CEO, Better Markets 
Rick Ketchum – Former CEO, FINRA and Former Director,  
 Division of Market Regulation, SEC 
Mehmet Kinak – Global Head of Systematic Trading &  
 Market Structure, T. Rowe Price 
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Dave Kling – Deputy General Counsel, Facebook 
Jiří Król – Deputy CEO, Global Head of Government Affairs,  
 AIMA 
Jonathan Lavine – Co-Chair, Bain Capital 
Sophia Lee – General Counsel, IEX 
Julius Leiman-Carbia – Chief Legal Officer, Wealthfront 
Shen Liping – Partner, Allbright Law Offices 
Temmy Lizarzabal – Managing Director & Co-Head of North  
 America Financial Institutions, Citigroup 
Simon Lorne – Vice Chairman & Chief Legal Officer, 
 Millennium Management LLC 
Matthew Mallow – Vice Chairman, BlackRock 
Michael Mann – Partner, Richards Kibbe & Orbe 
Monica Martinez – Senior Counsel, Banco Santander 
Andy McCarroll – General Counsel, Southeastern Asset 
 Management 
Mathew McDermott – Managing Director & Global Head of  
 Cross Asset Financing, Goldman Sachs 
William McNabb – Former Chairman & CEO, Vanguard 
Maria Newport – Analyst, Goldman Sachs 
Brian Nigito – Jane Street Capital 
Eric Pan – Former Director, Office of International Affairs, 
 CFTC 
Troy Paredes – Former Commissioner, SEC 
Hester Peirce – Commissioner, SEC 
Catarina Pereira – Chief of Staff, Comissão de Valores  
 Mobiliários (CVM) 
Jennifer Peve – Managing Director of Business Innovation,  
 DTCC 
Mike Piwowar – Former Acting Chairman, SEC 
Marta Poleszczuk – Vice President, Goldman Sachs 
Steve Randich – Executive Vice President & Chief Information  
 Officer, FINRA 
Brett Redfearn – Director of the Division of Trading &  
 Markets, SEC 
Greg Rodgers – Partner, Latham & Watkins 
Barbara Roper – Director of Investor Protection, Consumer 
Federation of America 
Ray Ross – Managing Director, Clearpool Group 
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Ari Rubenstein – Co-Founder & CEO, GTS 
Wyatt Russo – Vice President, Goldman Sachs 
Doug Schrank – Head of Trading, Southeastern Asset  
 Management 
Jameson Schriber – Partner, Goldman Sachs 
Jay Schulman – National Leader, Blockchain and Digital  
 Assets, RSM US LLP 
Jeffrey Solomon – CEO, Cowen Inc. 
Larry Sonsini – Founding Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich  
 & Rosati 
Colin Stretch – Former General Counsel, Facebook 
Jatin Suryawanshi – Managing Director & Head of Global  
 Quantitative Strategy, Jefferies Financial Group 
Aron Szapiro – Head of Policy Research, Morningstar 
Ken Trippe – Director of Private Investments, Glenmede  
 Investment Management 
Greg Tusar – Cofounder, Tagomi Systems 
John W. White – Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore and  
 former Director, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC 
Edward Waitzer – Professor, Osgoode Hall Law and former  
 Partner, Stikeman Elliott 
Joe Wald – Managing Director, Clearpool Group 
Steven Wallman – Former Commissioner, SEC 
Elisse Walter – Former Chairman, SEC 
Russel Wermers – Director, Center for Financial Policy, Smith  
 School of Business, University of Maryland 
John Whelan – Managing Director of Digital Investment 
Banking, Banco Santander 
Bill White – CEO, ClearList 
Mary-Jo White – Former Chair, SEC and Partner, Debevoise  
 & Plimpton 
Bill Williams – Of Counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell 
Haimera Workie – Head of Financial Innovation & Senior 
Director, FINRA 
Eddy Wymeersch – Former Chair, Committee of European 
Securities Regulators 
Appendix C: Questions Sent Stakeholder Survey 
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Interviewees in Advance 
Background Questions – Capital Markets Operations 
 What in your view are the biggest problems, if any, 
of today’s capital markets? 
o Please discuss in terms of (a) facilitating 
capital formation, (b) liquidity to end-users, 
(c) accurate price discovery, and (d) cost-of-
operations. 
 Are there aspects of the functioning of our securities 
markets that you view as operating unfairly with 
regard to you or any other group of people? 
Impact of Technological Innovation 
 Over the next decade or so, how do you think 
technology will affect the functioning of capital 
markets in aspects with which you are familiar? 
 To what extent and in which specific ways are the 
capital markets subject to cyber security threats 
and what steps do you think can be taken to 
ameliorate any such threats? 
 Over the length of your career, how has technology 
affected your job and the functioning of capital 
markets in the aspects with which you are familiar?   
 Over the length of your career, how have new 
financial products enabled by technology affected 
your job and the functioning of capital markets in 
the aspects with which you are familiar? 
 In what way, if any, has globalization affected the 
functioning of capital markets in aspects with 
which you are familiar? 
o How do you foresee globalization affecting 
the functioning of the capital markets over 
the next decade or so? 
Impact of Distributed Ledger Technology 
 Please reflect on the impact, if any, that digital 
ledger technology is already having in your day-to-
day work, as well as how you anticipate that it will 
impact your work in the future.  In particular, 
please describe the challenges this technology is 
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posing to your historic ways of doing business and 
how you expect your business to adapt.  More 
generally, how do you think that the technology 
will, going forward, affect the market in which you 
operate and its regulation? 
 How might digital ledger technology help or hurt in 
terms of the capacity of securities markets to 
facilitate capital raising for both small market-cap 
firms and large market-cap firms? 
 How might ledger technology help or hurt in terms 
of the capacity of securities markets to provide 
liquidity to end users, accurate price discovery, and 
cost-of-operations? 
 How do you think digital ledger technology is going 
to affect the prevalence of cross border securities 
transactions and what do you think its effect will be 
on the effectiveness of regulation with respect to 
such transactions? 
Regulation 
 To the extent that your answers to any of the 
preceding questions suggest problems, what sort of 
additional regulation or deregulation, if any, would 
be an appropriate response? 
 Are there illegal practices occurring in the market 
that in your view are subject to inadequate 
enforcement? 
 Are there practices occurring in the market that in 
your view could benefit from additional regulatory 
clarity?   
 With respect to digital ledger technology 
specifically, what aspects of the market in which 
you operate do you believe are most in need of 
regulatory clarification?  Are there projects you 
would like to undertake or applications of digital 
ledger technology that are currently unfeasible due 
to regulatory uncertainty?  What questions would 
you most like answered? 
 How, in your view, would regulatory sandboxes 
facilitate understanding of advancing technology? 
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Next Steps 
 What, to you, are the most important questions 
concerning the functioning of securities markets for 
which adequate answers have not yet been 
provided? 
 How have your answers to the other survey 
questions been especially informed by your 
particular experiences and/or data to which you 
have access that is not publicly available? 
 Who else in or outside of your organization should 
we talk to regarding the issues we have discussed? 
 
